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This paper is an examination of the probable scope that the proposed Personal Property 
Securities Act would have in New 'Zealand. The writer examines an number of transactions 
and types of collateral that are less commonly used in .financing arrangements and reaches 
conclusions as to whether or not such transactions would come within the scope of the 
draft Act if passed in its present form Some comment is also made as to whether certain 
transactions ought to come within the scope of the draft Act and whether amendments 
ought to be made. 
The conclusion reached is that amendments to the draft Act will be necessary in some 
areas to enable the courts to include or exclude certain transactions in accordance with 
the intent of the Act. However equally important will be the approach which the judiciary 
take to the reforms when passed into law. It is clear that a generous and purposive 
interpretation will be needed to ensure that the a technical and formalistic distinctions 
which plague our current law do not infect any reforms. 
Word length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 19 200 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The current law relating to the creation, priority and enforcement of security interests in 
personal property is based on common law and statutes which have their origins in the 
formalistic era of the Victorian age and before. Different rules have evolved for different 
transactions dependant on the nature of the parties, the subject matter, and the form of the 
arrangement. This prompted one commentator to say in respect of the United Kingdom 
system upon which our's is modelled: 1 
There should be a new law on security interests to replace the multitude of different rules we now 
have. This would simplify the law enormously and speed up business transactions, and would ensure 
that like transactions are treated alike. There is a well-tried model in Canada and the United States 
on which the new law should be based. 
This view was endorsed by the New Zealand Law Commission in its Report No 8: A 
Personal Property Securities Act for New 7.ealand.2 In that report the Commission 
recommended the adoption of a system of personal property security regulation based on 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code which is in force in most of the United States 
and has been adopted in varying forms by most of the Canadian provinces. A draft Act 
was included in the report. 
Under the current law innocent purchasers and security holders will commonly be 
disappointed due to the prior claim of some undisclosed and undiscoverable interest. Such 
prior interests commonly take the form of title based arrangements such as retention of title 
clauses or true hire purchase agreements. The intent of the proposed Personal Property 
1A L Diamond, A Review of Security Interests in Personal Property (1989, Department 
of Trade and Industry (UK)). 
2Law Commission, Wellington, 1989. 
LAW LIBRA8Y 
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Securities Act (PPSA) is to ensure that a consumer or financier can act with the assurance 
that the assets in one person's possession will have no encumbrances over them other than 
those shown on a central register. 
The PPSA seeks to provide a comprehensive code in respect of all types of personal 
property security arrangements. In doing so it spreads its net wide in order to bring all 
such transactions within its scope. In general the parameters of the proposed Act are 
limited by three factors. Firstly the property which is the subject of the transaction must 
fall within one of the categories in clause 4(l)(a) to (g) which attempt to classify all types 
of personal property. Secondly the transaction must be intended to secure the performance 
or payment of some obligation. Thirdly the transaction must be effected by the creditor 
holding an interest in personal property (regardless whether it be title or some lesser 
interest). The manner in which these boundaries of the Act are interpreted by the courts 
will have a significant impact on the effectiveness of such reforms in achieving their 
intended ends. 
The question of whether a transaction falls within the scope of the PPSA will have 
substantial ramifications for all parties concerned. A security interest perfected in 
accordance with the Act will be granted priority over any other later perfected or 
unperfected interests over the same property. Furthermore any security arrangement will 
be unenforceable against third parties unless certain minimum criteria are satisfied. 3 In 
other jurisdictions where Article 9 type legislation has been implemented any unperfected 
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security interests are unenforceable against a liquidator of the debtor.4 Similar provisions 
exist under our current legislation. 5 The draft Act does not, at present, have such a 
provision although it is likely that one will be inserted before the Act is passed into law.6 
Accordingly whether an arrangement falls within the scope of the legislation will have an 
important impact on whether or not a creditor gets preferential treatment on the liquidation 
of the debtor. A further departure in the draft Act from its origins is the absence of 
provisions dealing with remedies on the debtors default. 
Whether or not a particular transaction needs to be registered under the draft Act for full 
protection of the creditor may have a significant impact on the utility of certain transactions 
in the marketplace. In some cases to have to disclose financial information on a public 
register may be so repugnant to the parties that the likelihood of such a device being used 
(or at least registered) is greatly reduced.7 In some cases the current attraction of certain 
transactions is the fact that they need not be registered. Conversely there will exist other 
situations which would not provide the creditor with the certainty that the collateral held 
was valuable as security and may reduce the likelihood of such arrangements being 
reached.8 
4Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-301 (l)(b)(3), also s 20 Personal Property 
Securities Act 1989 (British Columbia). 
5Section 103 Companies Act 1955, section 18 Chattels Transfer Act 1924. 
6Dugan "Subordination Agreements, Deposit Account Financing, and Loan Participation 
under the Draft Personal Property Securities Act" in Prebble (ed) Dimensions in Business 
Finance Law (Butterworths, Wellington 1992). 
7This may be the case in respect of participation agreements. See above part IV E. 
8This is likely to be the case in respect of security over licences and quotas. See above 
part VI. 
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This paper examines a number of transactions and attempts to identify firstly whether they 
fall within the scope of the draft PPSA and the implications of this, and secondly whether 
from a policy viewpoint they ought to be brought within, or excluded from the scope of 
the Act. A number of important questions are not touched on in this paper. The 
relationship between interests arising from contracts of sale and security interests is not 
examined.9 Neither is the nexus between a lease, a finance lease and a security 
arrangement examined.10 Similarly transactions which fall in the grey area between 
consensual and non consensual security interests have not been discussed. 
II THE PHILOSOPHY ARTICLE 9 
The proposed reforms involve a fundamental shift in the philosophy behind personal 
property securities regulation. The current law is based on concepts of title, the nature of 
interests held and the identity of the parties. The result is that personal property security 
problems are addressed under the current law by establishing the legal and conceptual form 
of the arrangements entered into. This formalistic view is rejected under the North 
American model in favour of a substantive or realist approach which deals with 
arrangements according to their nature and effect as between the parties. The new regime 
seeks to replace the sometimes fine distinctions of ownership and possession, legal and 
9The draft Act seeks to many such problems by providing that all commercial 
consignments, hire purchase agreements and retention of title arrangements will be subject 
to the provisions of the Act. However it is likely uncertainties will exist in respect of 
vendor's liens, implied terms on sale and other areas. 
1°The draft Act seeks to circumvent the difficulties experienced in other jurisdictions 
which distinguish leases and leases intended as security by including all leases for a term 
of more than a year within the scope of the Act: cl 4(4)(b). 
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equitable interests, title and interests and so on. In their place will be an approach which 
looks to the substance and result of a transaction and treats it accordingly. Similarly the 
PPSA recognises interests in kinds of property which did not exist or were not recognised 
when our existing rules were developed. Such property includes chattel paper, negotiable 
instruments, intellectual property and intangible property generally. 
Because the current law looks to the form of a transaction and the legal incidents flowing 
from that form the generic label of "security" is of little use under the current system. 
Once it is established that the agreement is a mortgage or charge one need go no further 
to discover the results of the arrangement. The PPSA takes a view which is arguably more 
akin to the civilian approach to the law in so far as it requires one to look first to the 
effects of the transaction and to then categorise it as a security transaction if appropriate. 11 
This realist, transaction based approach was first imported into the common law securities 
area in the drafting of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code by Karl Llewellyn and 
others. 12 In the interpretation of the PPSA it has been necessary to recognise it as reform 
legislation and abandon the traditional conceptions of categorised security arrangements. 
This is not to say that the approach adopted by Article 9 is wholly a break with the past. 
Rather it was viewed by its drafters as part of an ongoing process of refinement. 13 Before 
the Code the law of personal property securities in the United States was spread 
11D E Allan "Security: Some Mysteries, Myths, & Monstrosities" (1989) 15 Mon ULR 
337. 
12S.Herman "Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution Continental 
Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code" (1982) 56 Tul LR 1125. 
13G Gilmore Security Interests in Personal Property 290 (Little Brown and Co, Boston, 
1965). 
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inconsistently amongst several statutes which categorised transactions according to their 
form, the nature of the collateral and the parties to the arrangement, much as is the case 
in New Zealand law today. In attempting to rationalise this situation the drafters saw a 
common thread in all of these transactions which had previously been considered wholly 
dissimilar. The Code therefore set out to provide a uniform framework within which such 
transactions could exist and develop independently of the previous artificial distinctions. 
This was not considered necessarily a novel approach as much as a natural and necessary 
progression. Gilmore, who assisted in the drafting put it thus: 14 
In a sense the unified structure of personal property security law had already been built: all that 
remained was to knock down the scaffolding which had been a temporary necessity during 
construction. 
Thus Article 9 was not so much a creation of new rules as an attempt to remove old 
distinctions to enable the law to reflect what was already a commercial reality. 
Although the Article 9 approach undeniably does away with a myriad of rules it does not 
attempt to abolish any particular method of security. Thus parties may still enter into 
mortgages, hire purchase arrangements, or assignments by way of security. However the 
significance of the distinctions is greatly reduced. Many security devices arose in order 
to avoid the constrictions of available methods of secured financing. Clear examples of 
this can be seen in hire purchase arrangements and retention of title agreements. Under the 
Article 9 approach it is futile to attempt to create some new form of security arrangement 
to avoid the requirements of registration. The Code approaches such a question in terms 
of the effect of the transaction rather than the guise which has been constructed for it. 
14Above n 13, 289. 
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This is not to say that the previous law is irrelevant. Rather the provisions of the new law 
will be interpreted in accordance with existing conceptions. Whether something functions 
as security is a question which is not answered by the legislation but rather by reference 
to the historical understanding in the law of what security is. Thus it could be said: 15 
What is important to remember is that the Article 9 security interest floats, unmoored in a void. 
Whether any particular transaction creates "an interest ... which secures ... an obligation" is a 
question for judicial determination. 
Similarly it is impossible to erase the legal history simply by the passing of an Act like the 
PPSA. Furthermore the draft Act, in common with Article 9 expressly preserves existing 
law unless inconsistent. 16 These existing concepts will provide a framework within which 
to apply the provisions of the Code. However it will also be possible to draw on the 
considerable jurisprudence from the North American jurisdictions in the implementation of 
an Article 9 approach. 
III THE CONCEPT OF A SECURITY INTEREST 
Both at common law and by statute our current system recognises only four types of 
transaction as being II security transactions 11 • 17 These are categorised as mortgage, charge, 
lien and pledge. To fall within one of these categories the arrangement must meet certain 
formal requirements. Goode, in attempting to find a common element, makes the following 
statement in respect of security arrangements generally: 18 
15 Above n 13, 334. 
16Clause 8. 
17R Goode Legal Problems of Credit and Security (2 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1988). 
18Above n 17, 1. 
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A Security interest: 
(1) arises from a transaction intended as security; 
(2) is a right in rem; 
(3) is created by a grant of declaration of trust. not by reservation; 
(4) is fixed or specific, implies a restriction on the debtors domination over the asset; 
(5) cannot be taken by the creditor over his own obligation to the debtor. 
Such a statement is arrived at by examining the currently accepted fonns of security and 
distilling common factors from them. The PPSA takes a fundamentally different approach. 
The functional approach first poses the question "what is security for?". One widely 
accepted answer to that question is to provide preference over unsecured creditors in the 
case of insolvency, and to provide a right of pursuit against particular property in the event 
of default by the debtor. 19 Therefore when examining a transaction under the PPSA 
scheme the question is firstly whether the parties intended to create those rights of 
preference and pursuit. Secondly whether the transaction effectively does so. If the answer 
is yes to both those questions then the scheme of the Act will apply. Clause 4 of the 
proposed PPSA provides the following general test of whether the features of security are 
present: 
(1) Subject to subsection (4), for the purposes of this Act "security interest" means an 
interest in [any personal property] created or provided for by a transaction that in substance 
secures payment or performance of an obligation, without regard to the form of the 
transactions and without regard to the identity of the person who has title to the collateral. 
That clause then continues to make specific inclusions and exclusions as to what will or 
will not constitute a security interest and therefore be subject to the legislative scheme. 
19D Allan, above n 11. 
12 
The PPSA appears to retain one central concept from the traditional approach to security 
transactions; the creditor must hold a interest in the goods which act as security. That is 
to say the creditor must have a right in rem. However the interest can arise by the creditor 
retaining, rather than the debtor granting the interest This is apparent from the rule that 
it is irrelevant whether the creditor's interest be title to the goods or some lesser interest 
such as the right to seize the goods and satisfy their claims from the proceeds of the sale 
of the property.20 An interest in property is distinct from a right to demand some kind 
of performance in respect of the property against the owner. An interest in the property 
is enforceable against third parties.21 However, if one views security as an arrangement 
which gives the security holder the right of pursuit against particular property and 
preference over other creditors,22 then the need for an interest in property may not always 
be necessary. 
In some circumstances it will be possible to create arrangements which, whilst not 
conferring a property interest, binds the parties in such a manner as to give the creditor 
rights to property which will pre-empt those of the unsecured creditors and thereby give 
priority. Such arrangements create rights which are enforceable only against the debtor, 
and are therefore in personam. Accordingly they will be defeated by any real rights (in 
rem rights) held by others. However they may enable the holder of the contractual right 
to get paid before other unsecured creditors. Such arrangements may include a promise by 
a debtor not to enter into any security arrangements, or not to do so without granting the 
20Clause 4(1). 
21R Goode "Security: A Pragmatic Conceptualist's Response" (1989) 15 Mon LR 361. 
22D Allan above n 11. 
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creditor security,23 an agreement to set off reciprocal obligations24 or, in some instances, 
an agreement to subordinate debt.25 
That such arrangements are not intended to fall within the scope of the PPSA is supported 
by the Law Commission report26 which states: 
Other security arrangements such as subordination agreements and negative pledge contracts will 
not normally fall within the general part of the definition unless, due to the terms of the transaction 
and the surrounding circumstances, they create an interest in personal property that secures the 
payment or performance of an obligation.27 
That stance was also adopted by the Australian Law Reform Commission in their recent 
report on a proposed PPSA and was justified in the following manner:28 
Parties can make contractual arrangements under which one of them can have [a right to take, or 
keep possession of, or otherwise deal with, the property on default] without creating an interest in 
the property. The Commission considered whether to apply the regime to cover such rights. It 
would not be appropriate to do so. The overseas proposals do not they are limited to rights that are 
founded in an interest in property. Rights not founded in an interest in property are effective, in 
general law, only as between the parties to the contract that created the rights.29 
It is submitted that the Australian Commission is incorrect when it asserts that rights not 
23See above part IV C. 
24See above part IV A. 
25In particular this will be the case where both the subordinated creditor and the debtor 
are insolvent. See part IV B above. 
26New Zealand Law Commission A Personal Property Securities Act for New 'Zealand: 
Report No 8 (law Commission, Wellington 1989). 
27 Above n 26, 102. 
28 Australian Law Reform Commission Personal Property Securities: Report No 64 
(Australian Law Reform Commission, Sydney, 1993). 
29 Above n 28, 44. 
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conferring an interest in property are effective only against the parties. As noted there will 
be instances where such rights will be effective against third parties insofar as they will 
give one party rights to property ahead of the general body of creditors. 
The manner in which one interprets the requirement of an "interest" under the PPSA is 
important to this question. In legal parlance, and particularly in respect of securities 
matters, interest is taken to mean a real right in certain property. This is the interpretation 
which is presumed by the drafters of the proposed Act. However it should be noted that 
a more generous interpretation is possible. The meaning of "to have an interest in 
property" could be construed to mean "will be effected by", or "have some control over 
the manner in which the property is dealt with". Under such an interpretation mere 
personal rights to insist that the debtor deal with certain property in a particular way could 
be thought of as a security interest. Whether the traditional restrictive stance ought to be 
taken, or the more generous one is largely a matter of policy. The way in which such 
questions are decided will determine the how comprehensive the PPSA is when enacted. 
From the statements in the Law Commission's reports it appears likely that the antipodean 
courts will follow their North American counterparts and adopt a traditional approach 
which requires a right in property to establish a security interest. 
III ARRANGEMENTS NOT CONFERRING AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY 
A Set Off Between Lender and a Depositor/Borrower 
The ability of parties with reciprocal debts to set off those debts is a well established 
common law right. Such rights can exist outside of contractual arrangements and exist as 
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a matter of course when certain criteria are satisfied. 30 However as well as set off by 
operation of law parties may agree that certain obligations will be unenforceable in the 
absence of performance of their own obligations. The usual relationship between depositor 
and banker is one of creditor and debtor. Although the depositor may notionally deposit 
into a certain account, in actual fact the bank keeps all general deposits in an 
undifferentiated manner and deals with those funds in the course of its business. As such 
the obligation of the bank to repay the deposit is simply that of a debtor to repay in 
accordance with the original banker-customer contract. The deposit therefore is an ordinary 
debt and may be dealt with as such by the depositor. One of the things that the depositor 
may wish to do with the debt is to assign it, either absolutely or by way of security. 
Consider the following facts: 
A deposits $100 OOO with Bank for a fixed temi of three years. Shortly thereafter A seeks to obtain 
finance from Financier. As security for the advance A assigns the right to payment from bank on 
maturity to Financier on the basis that it will be reassigned once the loan and interest is repaid in 
full (ie an assignment by way of security). 
In such a case the secured party's interest in the deposit would fall under the scope of the 
PPSA in one of several possible categories. If the right to payment of the 
depositor/creditor is viewed as being transferred by such a transaction then it would fall 
squarely within clause 4(4)(a) as the transfer of an account receivable. If the right to 
receive payment was transferred in a documentary form (such as a deposit certificate) then 
it would fall under clause 4(1)(e) as a security interest in a negotiable instrument. It would 
therefore seem sensible that, if the depositor assigns the deposit to the same bank which 
holds the deposit by way of security for an advance or other facility, that the interest of the 
3°Those criteria are that the debts exist between the same parties in the same capacity, 
the debt is mature, and the debt is a liquidated amount. 
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bank should also fall within the scope of the PPSA because the only difference is that in 
such a case both lender and depositee are the same person. However the point is by no 
means clear. 
The situation is problematic for several reasons. In some instances the right of set off 
exercised by the bank will not be created or intended by the parties. This would be the 
case where a customer is insolvent and the bank seeks to set off a credit balance against 
an overdraft. Although such a set off does effectively give the bank an exclusive right of 
recourse to a particular fund it does not arise consensually and therefore probably falls 
outside of the Act. However where the right of set off is contained in a more formal 
arrangement the case for regulation becomes stronger as there is a clear intent that the bank 
gain priority over other creditors and recourse to that particular fund for payment in the 
event of default. 
To bring such arrangements within the scope of the Act is however difficult. A right to 
a set of, even if viewed as a security interest, poses problems in respect of registration and 
perfection under the Article 9 regime. A major difficulty is the fact that the collateral (ie 
the deposit) is in the possession of the secured party. Accordingly pursuant to clause 18(1) 
the security is perfected by possession and the interest need not be registered. Such a 
situation is unsatisfactory as it is not apparent to third parties that the bank holds the funds 
as security in its capacity of creditor, rather than as debtor in its capacity of banker. 
If deposit accounts were expressly included in the Act special provision would also need 
to be made for the description of the collateral and perfection of the interest. Existing 
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general provisions as to description would not be adequate. 31 Identification by reference 
to institution, account number and sum held would be necessary. Particular problems 
would arise in respect of accounts with changing balances, especially where the balance 
fluctuated below the amount of the secured debt. Accordingly set off transactions which 
are intended as security ought to be expressly brought with in the ambit of the Act, 
however in so doing amendment will be necessary to ensure that such arrangements are 
dealt with in a manner consistent with the scheme and philosophy of the Act. 
Whether such a transaction falls within the scope of the draft Act in its current form is not 
clear. The difficulty that such an arrangement gives rise to is the fact that the bank, in 
receiving a transfer by way of assignment of the deposit to secure an advance, is receiving 
a transfer of its own indebtedness. If this is followed through to its logical conclusion, in 
the event that the depositor did not repay the loan the bank could then proceed against 
itself to enforce its security. The absurdity of such a situation has led commentators to say 
that such an arrangement does not give rise to any security interest in favour of the bank 
but rather a right of set off whereby the obligation to repay the deposit is dependant on the 
depositor fulfilling other obligations.32 This approach has been adopted by the English 
Courts. In Re Charge Card Services33 a credit card company financed its operations by 
assigning its accounts receivable to a finance company. The finance contract provided that 
the financier could retain such amounts obtained by the realisation of the receivables as it 
deemed fit as security for the outstanding obligations of the charge card company. That 
31Clause 9(1)(b). 
32Above n 17, 10. 
33[1986] 3 All ER 289. 
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is to say that the financier took "security" by entering into an agreement whereby it was 
not obliged to repay its indebtedness until the charge card company had discharged its 
obligations. It was argued that this amounted to a security arrangement which was void 
for non registration under the company securities legislation.34 However the Court held 
that the arrangement was not a charge when it said: 
The sum due from Commercial Credit to the company under the agreement is, of course, a book debt 
of the company which the company can charge to a third party. In my judgement, however, it 
cannot be charged in favour of Commercial Credit itself, for the simple reason that reason that a 
charge in favour of a debtor of his own indebtedness to the chargor is conceptually impossible. 
By such an analysis a contractual arrangement such as that in Re Charge Card Services 
Ltd must be viewed either as a right to set off reciprocal obligations, or an agreement that 
the amount of indebtedness is to be determined by taking an account of the indebtedness 
of the parties to the transaction to each other. 
By this approach the right to a set off is not a security interest. It is not even an 
enforceable right. Rather it is simply a defence which may be raised to any claim for 
payment of the indebtedness before the creditors own obligation is discharged. This is a 
strictly procedural approach and does not sit well with the manner in which the parties to 
the transaction view the situation or the practical effect of the arrangement. It has been 
cogently argued that the assignment of a debt to the debtor by way of security ought to be 
viewed as a security arrangement as there was no intention to merge the indebtedness and 
the amount secured. 35 
34Section 95(1) Companies Act 1948 (UK). 
35 Above n 11. 
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The approach in Re Charge Card Services is based in a formalistic mode of thinking which 
the PPSA is actively trying to avoid. The UCC makes specific provision for such 
arrangements. Article 9-105(1) provides that that Article (which equates with the 
provisions of the PPSA) does not apply to "a transfer of an interest in any deposit account". 
The effect of this provision is to exempt the right of set off from any registration 
requirements. However a bank's right of set off is subject to the article 9 provisions in 
respect of a secured party's right to proceeds36 and priorities to proceeds.37 Thus under 
the US system it is recognised that the ability of a bank to set off the indebtedness of a 
depositor against funds held has the effect of creating the rights of preference over other 
creditors and pursuit against particular property which make it tantamount to a security 
interest However as a matter of policy the United States legislators have given such 
arrangements priority over other perfected security interests without registration unless it 
can be shown that the funds in the account are the proceeds of collateral over which a 
perfected security interest existed and the rules of tracing allow the creditor to follow the 
proceeds into that fund. Thus in Citizens National Bank v Mid States Development Co38 
a secured party was seeking to trace the proceeds of the realisation of collateral (inventory 
and accounts) into the bank account held with the appellant bank. The security interest was 
a clearly perfected pursuant to Article 9. The Court saw this as a matter in which the 
priority rules contained in Article 9 were applicable. Therefore because the proceeds could 
be traced into the bank account, the interest of the secured party existed in respect of those 
funds and prevailed over the right of set off of the bank. 
36Article 9-306. 
37 Article 9-312. 
38(1978) 380 NE 2d 1243 (Ind Ct App). 
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It should be noted that the approach found m Citizens National Bank v Mid States 
Development Co is applicable only for set offs in respect of deposit accounts because of 
the relationship between Articles 4 and 9 of the UCC. 39 The position where such 
provisions do not apply is similar to that in Re Charge Card Services40 insofar as the 
common law rules on set off will determine whether or not the set off will be able to be 
maintained against a party who alleges a security over the funds held. In Indian Head 
Credit Union v Andrew41 the credit union held a security interest in respect of a herd of 
cattle which had been disposed of and the proceeds deposited with the bank. The bank, 
was on notice that the debtor was expecting funds for the cattle and that the credit union 
had an interest in those proceeds. However knowing this they advanced a sum equal to the 
proceeds to the debtor on the security of the deposit. When the credit union attempted to 
recover the proceeds from the bank the bank purported to set of the proceeds against the 
indebtedness of the debtor and thereby extinguish the obligations. It was held by the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that the fact that the bank knew of the interest of the credit 
union in the proceeds meant that by applying common law rules the bank was denied the 
right of set off. 
Interestingly California, in its adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, deviated from 
the official text, presumably in an effort to address the problem. The official text reads42 
This Article does not apply: ... 
39which deal with banker customer relations and personal property securities 
respectively. 
40 Above n 33. 
41 (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 462 (Saskatchewan CA). 
42 Article 9-104. 
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(i) To any right of set off; or to a security interest of a bank, savings and loan association, 
or any like organisation in any deposit, savings, passbook or like account maintained with 
such organisation; 
In contrast the corresponding provision of the California Code simply provides that "This 
[Article] does not apply; ... (i) To any right of set off.43 The absence of the further 
exclusions in the California Code indicates that in that jurisdiction where a lending 
institution takes security over funds deposited with it the arrangement will be viewed as 
a secured transaction and subject to the Code accordingly. Such an approach accords with 
the understanding and intent of the parties to the transaction and should be adopted in New 
Zealand. The utility of the California provision is however somewhat undermined, at least 
from the perspective of third parties, insofar as under the Code the security is perfected on 
execution.44 Consequently the only impact of the Code is on the remedies of the parties 
in case of default of which there are no corresponding provisions in the draft Act. It is 
submitted that in the New Zealand Act provision needs to be made for the registration of 
such arrangements for perfection notwithstanding possession of the collateral by the secured 
party. 
It is submitted that where a set off over the debtors own obligations arises from an 
consensual arrangement between the parties the provisions of the PPSA ought to apply. 
Whilst it is arguable that such a set off falls within the clause 4 definition of security 
interest the authorities clearly weigh against this. Despite the view expressed in the cases 
discussed above such an arrangement is clearly intended by the parties to act as a security 
43 Article 9-104. 
44 Article 9-302(1)(g)(i). 
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arrangement whereby the creditor will have recourse to a particular fund in the event of 
default by the debtor. Furthermore, in the event that the set off is upheld in the case of a 
dispute, it clearly has the effect of depriving other creditors of the benefit of those funds 
in the event of the insolvency of the debtor and thus has all of the effects of a security 
arrangement. In particular, whilst the existence of a right of set off in such an arrangement 
is known and intended between the parties to the arrangement, it is hidden from third 
parties who may deal with the debtor. Accordingly registration is appropriate. The 
existence of a discrete set of common law rules in respect of the determination of the right 
of set off as against parties who allege a security interest in the fund is to be avoided. To 
enable this substantial amendment of the draft Act is needed to accommodate such 
transactions in a manner consistent with the scheme and intent of the reforms. 
B Subordination Agreements 
It has long been recognised that it is open to creditors to enter into arrangements altering 
the order in which their respective debts will be paid. Thus if A holds a first ranking 
debenture and B a second ranking debenture they may agree between themselves to reverse 
the order of priorities.45 Similarly if A and B are both unsecured creditors (and therefore 
ranking equally) one party may agree to postpone their rights of payment to those of the 
other debtor.46 Subordination agreements as a method of increasing the likelihood of 
repayment appear to have their origins in the United States.47 
45The ability to subordinate securities is confirmed in clause 33 of the draft Act. 
46Equitycorp Finance Group Ltd v Cheah [1991] 1 NZLR 299 (CA). 
47P Coogan, H Kripke, F Weiss "The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination 
Agreements, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and 
Participation Agreements" (1965) 79 Harv LR 229. 
23 
One common situation is when the subordinating creditor has an interest in the company 
such as that of a major shareholder, and subordinates existing debt to enable funding from 
other sources. Such arrangements may exist from the inception of the business and the 
debt of the subordinated creditor will often be accounted for as part of the equity of the 
undertaking.48 A second kind of arrangement where debt subordination is likely to occur 
is where an enterprise is in financial difficulty and the existing creditor(s) subordinates to 
increase the chances of recovering what might be a doubtful debt by enabling further 
finance or inventory to be obtained. A third situation where such a device is employed is 
where a company seeks to obtain debt capital by issuing subordinated debt securities. Such 
securities may be held by numerous investor/creditors who, in return for higher yields, 
agree to subordinate their debt to the general body of creditors. 49 The inclusion of some 
other frequently used (and currently unregulated) security devices within the scope of the 
PPSA may result in subordination agreements becoming a more popular means of security 
in New Zealand. 
A further and important aspect of subordination agreements is the identity of the parties 
between whom they are reached. In some cases the agreement will be directly between the 
subordinated and preferred creditors as, would probably be the case where a 
creditor/shareholder was seeking finance for a company. Alternately the agreement might 
48D Chisholm "The Pari Passu Rule" (1993) 72 Accountants Journal vol 9, 49. 
49 A recent example of this can be found in the Brierly Investments Limited public 
offer of capital notes contained in its prospectus in 1993 (Brierly Investments Limited, 
Wellington, 1993). The terms of which provided inter alia: 
2.3 The obligations of either or both of the Company of the Guarantor to the noteholder ... 
(a) rank in point of priority and right of payment behind, and are subordinated to, all senior 
debt [defined as all debt not expressly subordinated] of tbe Company and tbe Guarantor as 
the case may be. 
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be directly between the debtor and the subordinated creditor as in the case of publicly 
issued subordinated debt securities. Thirdly the agreement may be tripartite including 
debtor and creditors as might be the case where an existing creditor is willing to 
subordinate its debt to enable further finance which may facilitate a financial recovery of 
the debtor. In respect of subordination concerning unsecured debt the transaction is simply 
an agreement that the subordinated creditor has no right to payment until the debt owed to 
the other (senior or preferred) creditor has been discharged. If, in breach of this 
arrangement, the subordinated creditor receives payment, the preferred creditor would have 
an action against the subordinated creditor for breach of the contract. The question arises 
as to whether such arrangements create security interests which are, or ought to come 
within the scope of the PPSA. 
At first blush a subordination agreement seems quite innocuous, creating only personal 
rights between the parties to the arrangement. In the event that the debtor trades 
successfully it is established law that the subordination agreement will be binding on the 
parties to it.50 To date the courts have been reluctant to uphold such arrangements in the 
event of liquidations on the basis that they upset the pari passu rule and are therefore 
50 Re Ararimu Holdings Ltd (1989) 4 NZCLC 65,104 where a subordination agreement 
was enforced where a company was in statutory management. 
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against public policy.51 However with the passing of the Companies Act 1993 such 
arrangements will be upheld. 52 This may well make subordination agreements as a means 
of securing a debt more attractive to financiers. In so far as such agreements do displace 
the presumption of equal distribution they have one of the indicia of security agreements, 
namely preference over other creditors. In this sense it has been suggested that because, 
on the liquidation of the debtor, the senior creditor effectively gets a prior claim to in the 
insolvent's estate such agreements ought to be brought within the scope of the PPSA. This 
argument becomes even more forceful if one views the subordination of debt as a transfer 
of the subordinated creditors right to payment (or right to a dividend in the case of 
insolvency) to the preferred creditor, conditional on the preferred creditor not being paid 
in full. In effect the preferred creditor is receiving the right to seek a dividend from the 
estate of the insolvent debtor both for its own debt and for the debt of the subordinated 
creditor until it is satisfied in full. This looks very similar to an assignment of an account 
receivable by way of security. Such an arrangement is clearly intended to give one creditor 
priority over another and in a limited fashion to enable the preferred creditor to realise its 
claim from the assets of the insolvent debtor to the exclusion of others. 
The case for regulation of such agreements 1s even stronger where both debtor and 
51It is not intended to go into the issue of whether such agreements are or ought to be 
enforced under the current law. Suffice to say that authorities are divided on the point: 
AG v Mc Millan & Lockwood Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 51 (CA) where an arrangement by the 
crown to subordinate the debt of head contractors in favour of sub contractors was set 
aside. Compare Re Walker Construction Ltd (in liquidation) [1960] NZLR 523 where such 
an agreement was enforced where a company being involuntarily wound up. Most recently 
se Re Ararimu Partners Ltd Unreported, 4 June 1993, High Court, Auckland Registry, CL 
51/92, Barker J where a subordination agreement was set aside as in breach of s 293 of the 
Companies Act 1955. 
52Section 313(3). 
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subordinated creditor become insolvent. The likelihood of both debtor and subordinated 
creditor becoming insolvent is especially apparent where the subordinated creditor is closely 
connected with the company, and therefore may suffer financial disaster from the same 
event. Consider the following: 
A founds and operates Company. Rather than have a large share capital(and consequent restrictions 
on dividends and buybacks) Company's capital is comprised of $100 OOO of subordinated debt 
provided by A. A then seeks $50 OOO of personal finance and shows the $100 OOO account 
receivable as a personal asset. Bank provides the finance. Subsequently Company becomes 
insolvent and A quickly follows. The liquidator of A seeks a dividend from the estate of Company 
but is denied it in favour of the unsubordinated creditors. Bank seeks a dividend from the estate of 
A. 
In such a case the creditors of the (now insolvent) subordinated creditor are deprived of the 
asset of the debt owed by the (also insolvent) debtor. The benefit of that asset (which 
amounts only to a dividend if any) in the insolvent debtor's estate, goes to the preferred 
creditor under the subordination agreement. Thus it can be argued that by this hidden 
arrangement the creditors of the subordinated creditor are deprived of what appeared as an 
asset in that parties records. Moreover the arrangement had the effect of transferring a 
right to payment as security for an advance to the common debtor. 
It may be that to bring such arrangements within the provisions of the Act would be highly 
impractical. Under such a regime the preferred creditor would have to register the interest 
in the account receivable of the subordinated creditor. In some cases, such as publicly 
issued subordinated debt securities, it would not be viable or efficient to require 
registration. Similarly where the shareholder/director is a subordinated debtor many trade 
creditors would be unaware of their preferred status. Such registration would only be 
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workable where the subordination agreement was between two creditors such as a 
shareholder and a financier. If in such a case the interest was registered this would be 
notice to third parties that the subordinated debtor did not have an unencumbered right to 
payment of the debt. However from one perspective this gives an inaccurate view of the 
arrangement. The right of the preferred creditor is simply a right to be paid first and not 
in fact a transfer of the right to payment of the subordinated creditor. It should also be 
noted that in its current form the draft Act contains no provision avoiding securities against 
a liquidator. Unless such a provision is included the question of subordination agreements 
becomes largely academic as the contentious issues arise only in the event of the 
liquidation of both debtor and subordinated creditor. 
In any event such arrangements do not and ought not fall within the scope of the PPSA. 
Although they do give one creditor priority, such priority exists only as against the 
subordinated creditor(s). Any other unsecured creditors will be dealt with on equal terms 
with the preferred creditor. The PPSA is designed to provide a system to ensure that 
hidden security interests will not exist. In the large proportion of cases subordination 
agreements are known to all parties who may be effected by them. Accordingly there is 
no reason or need to bring such arrangements under the PPSA. The position of other 
creditors, at least of the debtor company, is unaffected by subordination agreements. 
Although creditors of the subordinated party may be adversely effected in the case of a 
double insolvency this is not grounds for requiring registration. The subordinated creditor 
had not granted or disposed of an interest in property. Rather it has entered into a simple 
contract which transpired to be disadvantageous. That the subordinated party has entered 
into a contract which transpired to be disr.dvantageous and reduced the amount available 
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for distribution does not mean that it is a security arrangement which ought to be regulated. 
The position is in substance no different from that where an insolvent has executed other 
contracts which have caused loss. Subordination agreements do not create the rights of 
preference over general creditors and the right to pursue their claim against particular 
property. Accordingly there is no need for registration to protect third parties. 
A further argument for not including such transactions within the scope of the PPSA can 
be found by examining the nature of the transactions themselves. As has been noted, on 
one analysis, the agreements appear to effect an assignment of the debt owed to the 
subordinated creditor by way of security to the preferred creditor. However this is in fact 
not the case. The rights confeITed by such an arrangement are wholly contractual. Whilst 
this is not to say that the parties could not arrange the transaction as an assignment and 
thereby create a security arrangement, this is not the manner in which such agreements are 
usually construed. Consider: 
Company is in financial difficulty so Financier agrees with Bank to subordinate its debt to that of 
Bank in consideration of a further advance. Notice of the arrangement is given to Company. 
company then discharges Financier's subordinated debt without discharging Bank's preferred debt. 
Financier refuses to disgorge the amount received to Bank. 
It is submitted that in this situation the preferred creditor would be limited to an action 
against the subordinated debtor under the contract. A different result would be reached in 
the event that the agreement provided for an assignment of the debt. If that were the case 
the preferred creditor would have an action against the subordinated creditor for money had 
and received (a proprietary claim) or alternatively could claim against the debtor for 
payment in accordance with the assignment. Similarly in the event that the contract was 
between the debtor an the subordinated creditor (as in the case of subordinated debt 
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securities) and the debtor paid the subordinated creditor(s) before or pari passu with the 
preferred creditors the preferred creditors could not allege a property interest in the amount 
paid, or seek repayment from the debtor as if it were an assignment.
53 
The inclusion of subordination agreements within the scope of the PPSA would be an 
artificiality which is disproportionate to the need for such a provision and the impact it 
would have. In any event such an inclusion would be meaningless in the absence of a 
clause which avoids unregistered interests against a liquidator. Also the framework of the 
Act, in respect of registration in particular, is inappropriate for the vast majority of 
subordination arrangements. Such arrangements are not constructed or intended to confer 
a security interest within the meaning of clause 4. Accordingly such arrangements ought 
to fall outside of the scope of the Act. 
C Negative Pledges 
The Negative pledge, whilst not a common form of lending is used in some, predominantly 
large, transactions. Such arrangements take the form of an agreement whereby the debtor 
undertakes to conduct its business in a certain manner. This may include maintaining 
certain debt to asset ratios, strict financial reporting requirements, and the maintaining of 
other monitors on a company's performance.54 Most importantly a negative pledge will 
53It should however be noted that in such a case the preferred creditors might have an 
action in contract under s 4 of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. The only issue will be 
whether the preferred creditors will be able to bring themselves within the terms of "a 
person designated by name description or reference to a class" which seems likely. 
541 Farrar Contemporary Issues in Company Law (CCH, Auckland, 1987) 126. 
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include a covenant that the debtor will not encumber its property. More complex clauses 
may grant a conditional right to other security, or prescribe certain results if security is 
given in breach of the clause. Negative pledge arrangements are particularly attractive to 
the debtor as it gives the appearance of creditworthiness and the fact that the assets of the 
company are unencumbered makes the financial position of the debtor look healthy. The 
utility of such arrangements for financiers is more questionable. The arrangement can be 
less complex than alternate security arrangements and there are (apparently) no registration 
requirements. However the effectiveness of such an arrangement in preventing the debtor 
from breaching the arrangement or ensuring a dividend pari passu or better with all other 
creditors on insolvency is doubtful. 
Although transactions which seek to prohibit a debtor from encumbering its assets are 
generically called negative pledges there are a number of permutations of the arrangement 
which, although placed in the same category, differ from each other substantially. Thus 
it may be that some kinds of negative pledges will come within the scope of the PPSA 
whilst others will not depending on the wording of the agreement and its effect. The most 
simple kind of negative pledge is simply a covenant by the debtor not to give security or 
otherwise encumber its assets to any other creditor. Such an arrangement will be sufficient 
where the creditor is the sole source of finance, or the debtors and other creditors are 
insignificant in proportion with the amount financed. Such an arrangement falls outside 
the scope of current personal property securities regulation and similarly would not be 
covered by the PPSA. Although the creditor may seek remedies against third parties, and 
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certain rights against the assets of the debtor may exist55 the agreement does not create 
any interest in property. In terms of security, the arrangement does not seek to give to the 
creditor any preference over other creditors, or the right to obtain payment from any 
particular fund. Rather the arrangement seeks to ensure that all creditors are treated 
equally. As such the arrangement is not one which creates an interest in property which 
secures the payment of an obligation within the meaning and intent of clause 4 and 
therefore will fall outside the scope of the PPSA. 
The simple negative pledge clause is not entirely attractive to financiers for the obvious 
reason that in the event of the debtor granting a security in breach of the clause the 
financier's remedies will be limited and will likely be subordinated to those of the newly 
secured creditor. Understandably therefore the creditor will often seek to protect itself by 
including in the agreement clauses which attempt to prevent or protect against the 
eventuality of the debtor breaching the agreement. The most often employed method of 
seeking to ensure that another creditor does not obtain priority over that of the negative 
pledge lender is to provide for the giving of security to the lender in the event of the 
breach. The nature of the obligation to grant security on breach will be important. 
55Such as the right to appoint a receiver of the debtor company: Bond Brewing 
Holdings v National Australia Bank [1990] ACLC 366 (HCA) where a syndicate of banks 
lent money to Bond Brewing Holdings which was secured by negative pledge agreements. 
On default it was held that the Court could appoint a receiver to the company on the 
application of the Banks. See also J Stone "Will the Court Appoint a Receiver at the 
Request of a Negative Pledge Lender?" (1991) NZLJ 312. Also the lender may have an 
action in tort for inducement to breach contract against the other (secured) creditor: First 
Wyoming Bank, Casper v Mudge (1988) 748 P2d 713, J Stone "Negative Pledge Clauses 
and the Tort of Interference With Contractual Relations" in J Prebble (ed) Banking and 
Foreign Exchange Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992). 
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A distinction can be made between cases where the debtor is under a contractual duty to 
provide equal or better security, and those where the security comes about because the 
breach of the negative pledge was a condition precedent to the creation of the security.
56 
The distinction may be observed by contrasting clauses which might create such an 
agreement The first might be created as follows: 
The debtor covenants not to grant security or encumber its assets in any way in favour of any other 
creditor unless the debtor grants an equal and rateable security to the creditor over the same assets 
that have been secured or encumbered to the other creditor. 
Such a clause creates only a contractual obligation on the debtor to grant a security in 
favour of the creditor. The failure to grant the security, like the breach of the agreement 
is a breach in contract and does not give rise to a security of any kind. Contrast however 
a clause which provides that a security interest will be created and attach on breach. Such 
a clause might provide: 
The debtor covenants not to grant security or encumber its assets in any way in favour of any other 
creditor. Should the debtor breach this clause, or take steps to breach this clause, there shall, 
immediately prior to the granting of any other security, attach to the assets which the debtor seeks 
to secure or encumber, a charge in favour of the creditor for the entire amount of the indebtedness 
of the debtor to the creditor. 
Such an arrangement is not dependant on any further acts by the debtor to create the 
security interest. Provided that the precondition has occurred the negative pledge lender 
will have a security interest in the property. 
Under the first type of arrangement it is clear that the parties intended a security interest 
to arise in the event of breach. However the agreement alone will not effect this intention. 
56J Stone "The "Affirmative" Negative Pledge" (1991) NZU 364. 
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Rather a further act on the part of the debtor (which is unlikely to be forthcoming) is 
required to grant the security. Accordingly such a clause is not a charge and is not subject 
to existing personal property securities regulation, nor would it fall within the scope of the 
PPSA. Whether or not the second type of arrangement would create a security interest is 
the source of considerable division amongst academics and judiciary. Goode
57 maintains 
that such an arrangement will be ineffective to create a security. He bases this proposition 
on the basis that the clause, at its inception, creates only a contractual right. To tum that 
contractual right into a security, value be given. It is maintained that the prior advance by 
the negative pledge lender cannot amount to consideration for the grant of a present 
security. This view is rejected by other writers
58 who maintain that equity will "see done 
that which ought to be done" and therefore once the condition precedent has occurred (the 
breach of the clause) the charge will be created. The fact that the later security is not 
voluntarily provided at the time of the breach by the debtor, but pursuant to an earlier 
agreement means that the earlier consideration will be sufficient to support the security. 
The cases on the point are divided and do not provide a clear analysis of the matter. In 
support of his view Goode cites Kelly v Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.
59 In that 
case the debtor company issued debenture notes which contained a negative pledge clause. 
A party took security with notice of the clause and was sued by the debenture holder who 
alleged an interest in the assets of the company on a number of different grounds including 
the existence of an equitable charge. This was rejected by the court who viewed the 
57Above n 17, 20. 
58P Gabriel, Legal Aspects of Syndicated Loans (1986), J Stone "The "Affirmative" 
Negative Pledge" (1991) NZLJ 364. 
59(1935)11 F Supp 497. Later set aside and remitted on the facts: (1936) 85 F 2d 61. 
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agreement as creating solely contractual rights. The opposite end of the spectrum can be 
found in Connecticut Co v New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad>° where the 
negative pledge debtor created subsidiaries and transferred property subject to the clause 
to them in return for shares. The subsidiaries then charged the property. This was a 
common manner of evading negative pledges.
61 The agreement between the parties 
contained the following clause: 
The [company] further promises that if it shall hereafter mortgage the whole or any part of the 
property and franchise by it owned except to renew existing mortgages, this debenture and the 
indebtedness evidenced herby shall participate in the security of such mortgage on equal terms with 
all other indebtedness or evidence of indebtedness to be secured by such mortgage. 
The Superior Court of Connecticut held that this clause created a security interest in the 
property of the company from the moment of the creation of the contract. In so finding 
Gager J said "While not an absolute agreement to give a mortgage it is an absolute 
agreement that if a mortgage is given these debentures shall be brought under the wing of 
its security".62 
It is submitted that negative pledges that provide for the automatic attachment of a security 
interest do create rights in property. The question therefore becomes whether or not such 
interests are or ought to be within the scope of the PPSA. Such an interest would have the 
effect of creating both priority over other creditors and a right of pursuit against particular 
assets. Similarly the parties intend it to have exactly that effect in the event of a breach 
of the negative pledge covenant. Under the current law such an arrangement (at least if 
60 107 Atl Rep 646 (1919). 
61Above n 13, 1002. 
62 Above n 60, 562. 
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created by a company as will usually be the case) is not registerable as a charge. The 
reason for this is that the agreement does not create a charge until the breach and therefore 
is not registerable until that point.63 This problem may be duplicated under the PPSA if 
adopted on its present wording. The negative pledge will not create an interest in property 
until the precondition (breach) occurs. Similarly the security will not attach until that 
point. This is due to the provisions of clause 10(1) which provides that the interest will 
attach to the goods when the parties intend it to attach. Until the moment of breach no 
security interest has been created or attached and therefore no registerable interest exists. 
However once attachment occurs an interest in property securing an obligation in terms of 
clause 4 exists and registration would be appropriate. 
Unlike a floating charge the negative pledge does not create a "present security which 
presently effects all the assets of the company expressed to be included in it" .64 Until 
such time as the agreement is breached no security exists whatsoever. The PPSA does not 
expressly provide for the registration of agreements which might at some later date create 
security interests. However clause 14 provides that a security interest is perfected by 
attachment and perfection (ie registration or possession) regardless of the order in which 
these steps occur. This clause seems to imply that a right that has not yet attached can be 
registered. Whether this applies only to security interests which, whilst created, have not 
attached (ie floating charges) or to contractual rights which may create security interests 
is ambiguous. 
63Such an arrangement would therefore not fall within s 102(2) of the Companies Act 
1955 as a charge on the company's assets. 
64Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910]2 KB 979 per Buckley LJ 999. 
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If registration cannot occur until a security interest has attached then registration is 
practically impossible as a creditor will rarely know when and if a negative pledge clause 
has been breached. However there is no logical bar to the registration of a clause which 
will, in prescribed circumstances, create a security interest which attaches immediately.65 
Clearly arrangements such as the negative pledge which provide for automatic creation and 
attachment of a security interest on breach ought to be brought within the scope of the 
PPSA. It may be appropriate to enlarge the definition of security interest to include 
arrangements which create an interest subject to the satisfaction of a condition precedent 
(such as the breach of a negative pledge clause), or to make clear that such arrangements 
can be effectively registered and will create a perfected security interest once the charge 
is created and attaches. It should however be noted that to subject such arrangements to 
the scheme of the Act may well reduce their utility. The attraction of such arrangements 
is in part their relative informality and the (apparent) lack of a need for registration. If 
negative pledges needed to be registered and were shown as charges on the debtors 
property they would, in effect, be little different to floating charges and it is likely that 
their use would decline. 
D Non Recourse Lending 
A further transaction which has some of the attributes of a security arrangement and bears 
consideration is that of non recourse lending. The non recourse lender agrees to seek 
payment from a particular fund and only that fund. An early example of such an 
arrangement can be found in Matthew v Blackmore66 A trustee of an estate borrowed 
65 Above n 56. 
66(1857) 1 H&N 762; 156 ER 1409. 
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money and agreed to repay the loan: 
out of the money which shall come into his hands, as such trustee of the aforesaid, from all and 
singular the land, hereditaments, and premises comprised in the said recited securities or the personal 
estate (if any) of the said [deceased].67 
When an action was brought against the trustee for payment of the debt the Court held that 
the words of the contract dictated that there was no obligation to pay except from the 
identified fund. More recently the approach has been approved in De Vigeur v IRC'8 
where the arrangement was identified as a loan notwithstanding that the right to repayment 
was conditional on the specified fund being sufficient 
One situation where such an arrangement might be used is that in Matthew v Blackmore 
where the borrower was acting as a trustee and therefore had legitimate reasons for not 
wishing to be held personally liable. An alternate reason for adopting such a form of 
transaction is that the lender may wish to participate in the risk of the enterprise and 
receive proportionately higher returns. This was the case in Ensign Tankers (leasing) Ltd 
v Stokes.69 That case concerned a transaction whereby company A lent $10.75m to 
company B. Company B applied $3.25m of its own funds to the enterprise of producing 
a film. The loan was to be repaid from (and only from) the proceeds of the film. The 
formula for repayment provided that the proceeds would be distributed between the 
companies (approximately) according to their financial contributions to the enterprise. 
Although as against the Commissioner of Inland Revenue the transaction was set aside and 
viewed as a joint venture, as between the parties it is likely that it would still be seen as 
67Above n 66, 765; 1410. 
68[1964] 2 All ER 907. 
69(1992] 2 WLR 469. 
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a non recourse loan. 70 In such a case the return for the lender may well differ according 
to the returns of the enterprise. 
Whether such transactions ought to come within the scope of the PPSA will depend on 
whether such an arrangement creates an interest in property which secures the repayment 
of an obligation pursuant to clause 4. Although often referred to as simple loans the fact 
is that in many ways the creditor assumes the rights of ownership of the asset or fund to 
which recourse is to be had, as well as the liabilities attendant upon the ownership of an 
asset. For example in the Ensign Tankers case the lender was to receive proportionately 
the benefits of the proceeds of the loan, namely the film. In reality this is not a simple 
loan and a repayment but a sharing in the profits of the enterprise, as the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue successfully argued. From the other perspective the lender also adopts 
the risk of the failure of the enterprise. In the event that the fund from which the loan is 
to be repaid is worthless there will be no other liability on the debtor to repay.71 In this 
sense the lender is a joint venturer in the business and, according to the terms of the 
agreement, bears a proportion of the risks along with the borrower. In such a transaction 
the line between that of a lender and a part owner of an enterprise becomes blurred. 
Another aspect of such an arrangement which sets it apart from other types of simple loan 
transactions is the right to be paid from a particular fund. As has been noted the right to 
70J Prebble "Remedies of a Non Recourse Lender" in J Prebble (ed) Dimensions in 
Banking and Foreign Exchange Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 148. 
71 The King v New Queensland Copper Co Ltd (1917) 23 CLR 495: a stipulation that 
a loan was payable only from the proceeds of a certain project was enforceable 
notwithstanding the absence of any trustee capacity. 
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payment from a particular fund is one of the features (along with preference over other 
creditors) which indicates that a security interest exists. Thus in the same manner as a 
charge holder may, the debtor under a non recourse loan may insist on payment from a 
particular fund, or the proceeds of certain assets. 
Some writers consider that non recourse loans confer no property interest whatsoever. If 
this were so then clearly they would be outside the scope of the PPSA. However this is 
not necessarily the case. Prebble takes this view.72 He suggests that whilst security can 
exist alongside a non recourse loan, it will not of itself create it. However Goode (who 
Prebble strangely cites in support), citing Matthew v Blackmore13 states in respect of a non 
recourse loan where the fund is expressed to be the proceeds of an account receivable: 
74 
[A] non recourse loan on the security of receivables, in which the assignor undertakes no personal 
repayment obligation and the financier agrees to look exclusively to the receivables to secure 
recoupment, looks very much like a sale disguised as a mortgage. But the concept of non recourse 
lending is well established in English law. The transaction remains a loan transaction even though 
the parties have agreed that the assignor is to make repayment only from an identified fund and not 
from his own resources. The transaction is in fact distinguishable from a sale in that once the 
financier has his advance with stipulated interest, any remaining value in the receivables belongs to 
the assignor. 
Thus Goode observes that it is possible to create a non recourse loan which effectively 
grants a mortgage interest over the specified fund. Thus, depending on the agreement and 
its effect, a non recourse loan may create property rights. 
72Above n 70, 142. 
73 Above n 66. 
74Above n 66, 108. 
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One way in which one can answer the question of the nature of the lender's rights in a non 
recourse loan is to determine their standing as against third parties. Consider the situation 
where, as in Goode's example above, a debtor has lent money which is to be repaid only 
from the proceeds of an account receivable in the hands of the debtor. The debtor obtains 
payment of the account receivable and refuses to pay the lender. In the event of the 
insolvency of the debtor, would the lender have a right to the fund (providing the rules of 
tracing were satisfied) or would it rank as an unsecured creditor? It is submitted that the 
answer to that question is to be found not by classifying the transaction as non recourse, 
but rather by examining the agreement and intention of the parties. 
At its most simple such an arrangement is not intended to give any property rights over a 
fund. In the event of insolvency the lender will rank as an unsecured creditor for the value 
of the claim against the fund and be paid a proportionate dividend. Thus if the loan was 
for $10 OOO but the fund from which the claim is to be paid is only $5000 then the lender 
will have a claim against the estate for only $5000. If the debtor is insolvent and the 
dividend paid out is only 10 cents in the dollar then the final dividend of the lender will 
be $500.75 However this may not be the intention of the parties. In many cases the 
parties will intend that the fund be set aside to be exclusively applied to the satisfaction of 
the loan. Goode, in the extract cited above, whilst maintaining that the property is not 
transferred maintains that such an arrangement is a security over a book debt in the same 
manner as an assignment of the debt would be. If the intention of the parties to set aside 
a particular fund for the satisfaction of the indebtedness it may be that a property interest 
75See above n 70, 154. 
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in favour of the lender is created. 
One obvious way in which such an interest could be conferred is that of a trust. Such a 
trust might be implicit in the words of the agreement. Thus if the debtor agreed to keep 
the proceeds of certain accounts receivable separate and account for them to the lender this 
may be sufficient to put the debtor in the position of trustee in respect of such funds. This 
was the view of the court in respect of proceeds in Len Vidgen Ski and Leisure Ltd v 
Timaru Marine Supplies (1982) Ltd16 where the matter was considered in the context of 
a retention of title clause rather than non recourse lending. Alternately the parties could 
create a trust by explicit wording in the agreement whereby the fund from which the loan 
was to be repaid is expressly held on trust for the benefit of the lender. Alternately the 
arrangement may make clear that the right to the fund (including the right to require 
payment direct from the original borrower) is transferred to the non recourse lender. In any 
of the above situations a property interest is conferred on the lender in respect of the fund. 
The question then becomes whether such arrangements would fall within the scope of the 
PPSA. 
An arrangement whereby the lender received a property interest in a fund held by the 
debtor as in the above situations will be registerable under the PPSA. Not because it forms 
part of a non recourse loan agreement, but rather because of the nature of the agreement 
and the intention of the parties. The reason that the parties to such an arrangement would 
do so in such a manner as to create such rights is clearly to ensure repayment of the loan 
to the full extent of the agreement to the exclusion of third parties. Where the fund is held 
76[1986] 1 NZLR 349. 
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on trust by the debtor for the creditor this clearly falls within clause 4( 1) as a transfer of 
an interest in property for the purposes of security. Where the right to receive payments 
form a particular source is transferred then this will be caught under clause 4(3)(a). In 
such cases the creditor is gaining, not only recourse against a particular fund, but recourse 
against that fund to the exclusion of others and in priority to unsecured creditors. Non 
recourse transactions will be subject to the Act according to the intentions of the parties 
and the result of the agreement. If the arrangement gives the lender preference over other 
creditors and the right to be paid from a particular fund to the exclusion of others, and was 
intended to do so, then the Act ought to and will apply. 
E Loan Participation Agreements 
Loan participation agreements are a method by which financiers dispose of the benefits and 
burdens of financial interests to other parties and thereby increase the capital available for 
utilisation in their business. It should be noted that participation agreements may extend 
to the disposition of assets other than loans. Such transactions may include participation 
in business ventures as in the Ensign Tankers11 case. Whilst the principles and issues of 
such arrangements will be the same in either case, this paper will use loan participation 
agreements as a vehicle for discussion. Such transactions can have many of the features 
of a non recourse loans and many of the same issues will arise. One of the difficulties in 
discussing participation agreements is that the phrase has never been clearly defined and 
many diverse kinds of arrangement have been brought under the heading. The essence of 
such an arrangement is the sharing of the risk in and proceeds of loan assets by a financier. 
77 Above n 69. 
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This might be done when the loan is being proposed or after the loan has been made to 
free up the capital of the financier. 
A simple example of such an transaction might be where a smaller financier has an 
opportunity to enter into a large and lucrative loan transaction but has insufficient funds 
or is reluctant to risk that much capital in one transaction therefore invites a second 
financier to participate in the transaction by supplying a proportion of the funds and 
receiving a proportionate amount of the returns. Alternately a bank (or large corporation) 
might seek contributions from the general public to participate in a particular loan (or other 
enterprise) and issue debt participation securities. Warren78 provides some further 
examples of such transactions: 
(a) Bank A loans $1 OOO OOO to D and talces from him an unsecured negotiable promissory note for 
that amount Bank B agrees with bank A that it will participate in the loan to the extent of $500 
OOO. Bank A can now assign lo bank B an interest in the note by giving Bank B a certificate of 
participation; the note itself can be left with bank A. 
(b) Bank A buys $1 OOO OOO of conditional sales contracts from a finance company; bank B agrees 
to participate on a without recourse basis lo the extent of $500 OOO. 
Such arrangements are, of course, documented in a far more complex manner than the brief 
description provided above. In respect of the PPSA the question becomes whether or not 
such arrangements create security interests within the meaning of clause 4, and whether 
such financial arrangements are appropriate for inclusion within the scheme of the Act. 
Whether such arrangements fall within the provisions of the PPSA if passed will have a 
78W D Warren "Coverage of the Secured Transactions Division of the California 
Commercial Code" (1966) 13 UCLA LR 250. 
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significant impact. Firstly the lead bank may be reluctant to have to disclose the financial 
details of such large and potentially sensitive transactions on a public register. Furthennore 
to be categorised as a debtor rather than a joint venturer or participator may be at odds with 
the parties perception of the arrangement. In any event, in the case of large financial 
institutions, it is unlikely that third party creditors of the lead bank would inspect the 
register, or be concerned with the details of such a transaction. Also the loan assets in 
which the other bank is participating would not be accounted for, or appear, as assets of 
the lead bank and therefore it is unlikely that any third parties would be misled. At least 
part of the difficulty can be found in clause 4(4)(a) of the draft Act which deems the 
transfer of account receivables to be security interests. Whilst this increases clarity it also 
means that an element of artificiality is introduced into the Act which will cause hardship 
in cases such as the present. 
Some such arrangements will expressly not grant any interest in the indebtedness owed by 
the primary borrower to the participator. Such arrangements are often on a purely non 
recourse basis and therefore the participator takes the double risk that either the original 
borrower or the lending bank will be unable to repay the sum. Such an arrangement is 
described by Goode as a sale of sub participation of loan assets.79 Such an arrangement, 
is in fact not a sale at all, but rather the creation of a contractual right to payment from a 
particular fund. As it creates no property interests will not fall within the scope of clause 
4 of the PPSA. 
However other participation arrangements are clearly intended to grant an interest to the 
79Above n 17, 24. 
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participating financier. Such an interest may be in either the account receivable due from 
the original borrower, or in a security interest underlying the original loan, or in both. 
Participation arrangements can involve a complex series of transactions including 
guarantees, underwriting, trust arrangements, and the use of third parties. This is 
particularly the case where the participation is in respect of a large number of smaller 
loans.80 
One of the problems which has concerned the courts in respect of such transactions is 
whether they constitute an absolute assignment of the assets or a mortgage of them. 
81 
However by virtue of clause 4(4)(a) all assignments of account receivables will fall within 
the scope of the Act regardless of whether they are intended as security, or as an outright 
transfer. Therefore wherever such participation agreements grant to the participating 
financier anything more than a mere contractual right against the lending financier to 
receive a proportion of the proceeds of the loan, the provisions of the PPSA will apply. 
Put another way, wherever a participation arrangement gives to the participating financier 
a right to receive payment directly from the original borrower, or a right to demand that 
the original lender account for funds received, then the arrangement will fall within the 
80Such arrangements have been labelled securitisation arrangements. In recent years 
both the United building Society and the Housing Corporation of New Zealand have 
securitised large numbers of loans (residential mortgages). For Further discussion see D 
Ross "Securitisation" in J Prebble (ed) Dimensions in Banking and Foreign Exchange Law 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 
81Re George Ingle.field Ltd [1933] 1 Ch 1 where hire purchase agreements were 
discounted to a financier and the Court found this to be an outright sale. Compare Re 
Curtain Dream Plc [1990] BCLC 925 where a sale of inventory to a financier and 
conditional sale back was held to be a security arrangement. Also Hayes Securities Ltd v 
Bambury [1991] 1 NZLR 304 where a right to payments under contracts for the sale of 
land were assigned to a financier with a right of reassignment if certain conditions were 
met was found to be a security arrangement. 
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scope of the PPSA. Even if this were not the case it is submitted that one of the main 
reasons that the participator holds an interest in the account receivable is to give some 
security for repayment in the event of the insolvency of the original lender and would 
therefore fall within the scope of clause 4 of the PPSA in any event. 
In re SOAW Enterprises lnc82 the financier, Castle Rock, entered into an agreement 
whereby funds were loaned to SOA W to purchase land for subdivision. Repayment was 
to be made by payment of 30% of the sale price of the subdivided land. The agreement 
provided that until repayment was made Castle Rock had an interest in the underlying 
property and was entitled to the possession of deeds of sale in respect of the land. When 
SOA W became insolvent it fell to be determined whether the interest of the financier was 
a security interest or not The Court approached the problem by inquiring whether the 
financier had risked its funds as a stakeholder. On concluding that under the arrangement 
the financier was to be paid in any event the participation agreement was held to be a 
security arrangement. The fact that the financier was not limited to a 30% share of the 
proceeds of sale and could have recourse against the property generally in the event of a 
shortfall meant that the agreement was more than a joint venture type arrangement with 
both parties as co owners. 
Another example of a priority dispute between a security holder and a loan participant can 
be found in Army National Bank v Equity Developers lnc8
3 where Equitybank had made 
8237 UCC rep serv 885 (1983) (Tex SC), discussed in D Redle "Identifying Collateral 
as Real or Personal Property" (1990) 23 UCCLJ 185. 
83(1989) 9 UCC Rep 2d 722 (Kan SC). 
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loans to Equity Developers Inc. Army National Bank agreed to participate in the loans and 
an agreement to that effect was drawn up. Under the agreement the loan documents were 
to be held by an independent custodian but this never occurred. Equitybank pledged the 
loan documents to the Bank of Kansas to secure its own indebtedness. On the insolvency 
of Equitybank it came to be determined whether the security interest of the Bank of 
Kansas, which was perfected by possession, or the alleged part ownership of the loans by 
the Army bank prevailed. It was held that the Army bank failed and that its interest was 
an unperfected security interest. Comment has been made that if the Army Bank took the 
interest in the loans at the outset and was genuinely a co-owner of the loans then the 
decision would have been the reverse. 84 
The fact that such arrangements fall within the scope of the PPSA and, for complete 
protection, ought to be registered would probably not be well received by financiers. It 
may well be that in the absence of a provision that avoids unregistered security 
arrangements against the liquidator of the debtor the practical effect of this will be minimal. 
Participating financiers may well choose not to register on the basis that the risk of 
insolvency of the original lenders is small and the likelihood of a competing security 
interest is also small. Another factor which has been identified in respect of registering 
financing statements in such situations is the reluctance of financiers to disclose such 
arrangements on a public register.85 Furthermore the acknowledgement by the original 
lender that the obligation to pay the participating financier is in fact a debt secured over 
84B Clark The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
1993 Cumulative Supplement (Warren Gorman Lamont, Boston, 1993). 
85Above n 47. 
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certain assets would defeat one of the major purposes of the transaction which is to reduce 
the debt to assets ratio of the institution. 
It has been argued that such arrangements are inappropriate for inclusion in the scheme of 
PPSA type legislation.86 The writer concurs with this approach. Such a stance may be 
justified on a number of grounds. The arrangements are not intended to be secured loan 
arrangements in the usual sense of the expression. Rather they are a mode whereby 
financiers can avoid committing large amounts of capital to loans and act in a more 
intermediary role. The participating financier is not so much a lender as a joint venturer 
with the original lending bank who carries the risk of the failure of the loan along with the 
lending bank. The purpose of the PPSA is to provide a uniform system of registration and 
notice of interests held in personal property to ensure that third parties are not 
disadvantaged by unwittingly dealing with property in which a party holds a hidden 
interest Such protection is not necessary in respect of participation transactions because 
of the nature of both the assets being dealt with and the parties to the transaction. On a 
practical level, one method of avoiding complications is for the paiticipation to occur at 
the outset of the transaction and therefore the parties would be genuine co-owners rather 
than an assignee. 
F Subrogation 
The right of subrogation is not one which readily springs to mind when considering 
security arrangements. However the right to receive a right of action against another by 
virtue of subrogation may well fall within the scope of the PPSA. One area in which the 
86 Above n 47. 
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doctrine operates is the law of guarantees. In such circumstances the doctrine of 
subrogation serves to transfer to a party who has discharged the obligations of another 
pursuant to a contract of guarantee the right to receive payment under the original contract, 
and any security that the original creditor may have held in respect of the debt. Consider 
the following: 
A guarantees the obligations of B to Bank. In addition to the guarantee Bank takes security over 
certain property belonging to B. B defaults and A is called upon to discharge, and does discharge, 
the obligations of A. 
In this case B will have three separate rights against A. Firstly it will have a right to be 
indemnified for the amount paid (but only the amount paid) which is implicit in any 
relationship of guarantee. Secondly it will be able to assume the right to be paid the debt 
on the same terms as existed between A and C, including the right to claim interest, by 
virtue of the doctrine of subrogation. Also by virtue of the doctrine of subrogation B will 
be able to exercise any rights that C had in respect of security held over property. It is 
common for contracts of guarantee to stipulate the circumstances in which the right to 
subrogation may be exercised however the existence of the right is not dependant on an 
express contractual provision. 
The applicability of the PPSA can be argued on the basis that the existence of a right to 
subrogation is an arrangement which grants an interest in property and is intended to secure 
the performance of an obligation in terms of clause 4. The right to subrogate exists solely 
to protect the interests of the guarantor and to increase the likelihood of payment from the 
defaulting debtor. In the first place the right to subrogate to the debt which the guarantor 
discharged may give the guarantor rights greater than exist under the right of indemnity. 
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Such a transfer of what is effectively an account receivable is solely to facilitate the 
payment of interest and charges to the guarantor as would have been payable to the original 
creditor and is therefore intended as a security arrangement. In any event the transfer of 
an account receivable comes within the scope of the PPSA automatically by virtue of 
clause 4(4)(a). More obviously the transfer by operation of the doctrine of subrogation of 
securities which were held by the creditor clearly creates a security interest in favour of the 
guarantor to secure the payment of the amount the guarantor paid to the original creditor 
under the guarantee. 
More contentious is the transfer to the surety, by subrogation, of security type interest 
which, whilst not needing registration in the hands of the original creditor, would usually 
need registration in the hands of any other party to be enforceable. An example of such 
a situation could be as follows: 
Bank is a creditor in respect of a loan of $100 OOO to Debtor. Bank also holds a 3 year term deposit 
of $50 OOO which it is agreed will not be released until the loan is repaid and may be applied to 
reduce the loan in the event of default. The loan is guaranteed by Guarantor who, on default by 
Debtor repays the entire $100 OOO. 
Under the doctrine of subrogation the right to apply the deposit in reduction of the amount 
owing would be transferred to Guarantor. However in the hands of Bank such an interest 
(arguably) need not be registered as it is a right of set off which arises by operation of law. 
However in the hands of Guarantor it is an account receivable and therefore needs to be 
perfected by registration. 
Whether rights to security conferred by virtue of the doctrine of subrogation come within 
the scope of the draft Act will be of profound significance. If registration is needed then 
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the utility of the doctrine is greatly undermined as the rights of the guarantor only arise 
where the debtor is unable to pay. Presuming that the Act, when passed, will include a 
provision avoiding unperfected securities against a liquidator, it is likely that in such cases 
any registration by the guarantor would be to late. In any event it would lose any priority 
it had to earlier registered interests. 
One argument against the bringing of rights held by virtue of the doctrine of subrogation 
under the PPSA is that they are transferred by operation of law and therefore excluded by 
operation of clause 4(5)(a). However this is by no means clear. In Orakapo v Manson 
Investments81 The right of subrogation was treated quite clearly as arising from contract. 
In that case a loan had been received and was expressly used to discharge encumbrances 
on certain property. The lender purported to take security over that property for the loan 
advanced. Due to inadvertence on the part of the lender certain regulations were not 
complied with which made the contracts unenforceable. the lender attempted to argue that 
because the funds advanced had been used to discharge earlier mortgages they were 
subrogated to those mortgages. The House of Lords held that the right of subrogation was 
founded in contract and, whilst the mortgages would have otherwise been transferred, 
because the contract was unenforceable no right of subrogation could exist. Thus if 
subrogation is seen not as an interest arising by law but rather by implication in the 
contract between the parties, then it may well be subject to the PPSA. In any event it is 
artificial to say that the interest is created by operation of law. Even if subrogation is 
considered to be founded in law rather than contract, it only operates to effect the transfer 
of the security. The creation of the security interest is effected by the original agreement 
87[1978] AC 95. 
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between the debtor and creditor. 
Alternately it may be argued that rights received by virtue of subrogation are excluded from 
the scope of the Act by the operation of clause 4(5)(b)(ii) which excludes: 
a transfer of an unearned right to payment under a contract to a person who is to perform 
the transferor's obligations under the contract. 
If construed literally the guarantors right to payment from the debtor is unearned and the 
guarantor is a person who was obliged to perform the transferor's obligations under the 
contract. It is on this basis that the United States courts have excluded rights received by 
virtue of subrogation from the scope of comparable legislation.
88 However it is clear that 
that clause was intended to apply to situations where the right to payment is yet to be 
earned and the transferee has undertaken to do the work in consideration for the transfer 
of the right to receive payment for it, as in the case of a subcontractor who receives a right 
to direct payment from a project owner when undertaking work on behalf of a head 
contractor. The application of that clause to the case of subrogation is clearly 
inappropriate. 
This view was adopted in Transamerica Insurance Co v Barnett Bank of Marion County, 
NA 89 where Article 9 was applied to a transfer of a security interest by subrogation. That 
case involved a guarantor of the obligations of a head contractor in a construction project. 
When it paid under the guarantee it was subrogated to the ultimate buyer of the building's 
rights to retain payments due to the head contractor. However the bank who had been 
88Clause 4(5)(b)(ii) is mate1ially identical to article 9-104(f) of the UCC. 
89(1988) 5 UCC Rep 2d 879 (Fld Dist Ct App). 
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financing the project had a floating charge on the undertaking of the head contractor. The 
issue was one of priority between the subrogated guarantor and the charge holder in respect 
of payments due from the ultimate buyer. The court held that a subrogation was subject 
to Article 9 and non registration of the subrogated interest meant that the bank's interest 
prevailed. However the case was overturned on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. 
90 
That Court decided that a right received by subrogation gives the guarantor priority over 
other secured interests without registration under Article 9. This has been the orthodox 
approach. 91 
It is submitted that it would be inappropriate to require holders of subrogated rights to 
register their interests under the PPSA. The doctrine of subrogation seeks to place the 
subrogated surety in the same position that the creditor was in and give the surety the same 
rights against the debtor and any property that may have been secured. The rationale of 
the doctrine of subrogation lies in the perception that the surety adopts the same risk that 
the creditor would have had but for the guarantee. Thus the subrogated surety should be 
placed in an identical position to that of the creditor. On this analysis the Transamerica 
Co case was decided correctly before the Florida Court of Appeal. The surety is claiming 
not in its own right but through the creditor. In the same way as any personal defenses of 
the debtor against the creditor would be available against the guarantor, so all protection 
available to the creditor, including a right to set off or to withhold payments, should be 
available to the surety. If the creditors interest was a registered security interest, or an 
90(1989) 823 F2d 712 (3rd Cir). 
91See Interfirst Bank Dallas, NA v United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co (1989) 774 
SW 2d 391 where on facts similar to Transamerica the surety had priority over the 
financier in respect of the right to retained payments. 
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interest which was perfected without registration then the surety should gain the same 
benefits. If the creditor held an unperfected security interest the clearly the surety cannot 
be put in a better position than the creditor by subrogation but could take steps to perfect 
the interest. 
V INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY 
The PPSA seeks to provide a code in respect of the regulation of security interests in 
personal property. In order to achieve its objects it is drafted in a wide and general 
manner. This ensures that the court will not be encumbered by technical definitions or 
rigid frameworks when considering whether a transaction comes within the scope of the 
Act Rather the courts will be able to apply the Act to novel situations according to its 
intent and purpose. By and large this is a praiseworthy feature of the legislation however 
it results in an amount of vagueness as to the application of the Act. One of these 
peripheral areas is the concept of personal property. The areas which have caused the most 
difficulty are not new to the law. Firstly there remains a large grey area between intangible 
property and rights which do not amount to property at all. Secondly the distinction 
between personal property and real property, whilst obvious in some circumstances, is 
particularly unclear in respect of the transfer of the rights originating from or connected to 
interests in land. 
The distinction between real and personal property is one that has remained vague since 
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time immemorial. There are a number of arrangements which straddle this conceptual 
boundary. The anomalous position of leases of real estate as "chattels real" has long been 
recognised. Similarly the practical difficulties of distinguishing between property which 
had been temporarily brought onto the land (chattels) and those which were intended to 
form part of the real estate (fixtures) has given rise to considerable litigation. The PPSA 
seeks to circumvent this problem by providing that where a security interest is held in 
goods which are subsequently affixed to land, they will be deemed to be separate goods 
for the purposes of the security interest.
92 This is an example of the readiness of the 
drafters to cut across orthodox legal rules and fine conceptual distinctions in order to avoid 
results based on anomalous historically based categories of property. The nature of rights 
to income derived from an interest in land such as the assignment of mortgage payments 
is another uncertain area. Whether such debts are independent accounts receivable or are 
conceptually inseparable from the interest in land from which they derive has caused 
conflicting case law in North American jurisdictions. 
The obvious intent of the PPSA is to reform the law in respect of security interests in 
personal property. A separate and conceptually distinct set of rules exist in respect of the 
holding and transferring of interests in real property under the Land Transfer Act 1952. 
Despite the fact that these two areas of property law are dealt with in entirely separate 
manners there has been little attention in the PPSA directed towards distinguishing the two. 
The first guidance is found in clause 4(1) which states the classes of property over which 
security interests may be granted under the Act as: goods, a document of title to goods, a 
security, chattel paper, a negotiable instrument, money or, an intangible. When reference 
92Clause 29. 
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is had to the definitions of these terms in clause 2 it becomes apparent that one is taken 
no further than a general division of personal property into a number of classes. In 
particular intangible is described as personal property not fitting into any of the other 
categories, giving an entirely open ended definition. The only other guidance in the body 
of the Act is found in clauses 4(5)(b)(iii) and (ix) which provide that the Act will not apply 
to: 
(iii) the creation or transfer of an interest in land [or]; 
(ix) a transfer of a right to payment that arises in connection with an interest in land, including a 
transfer of rental payments payable under a lease or licence to occupy land unless the right to 
payment is evidenced by a security 
This clearly excludes security interest in real property and transfers of income from land 
itself from the scope of the Act. However there is still a large residual category of interests 
which include the transfer of rights to payment secured by interest in land, and the transfer 
of contractual rights concerning land. The division of rights to payment generally and 
rights to payment arising from an interest in land is problematic and arguably at odds with 
the anti-formalistic philosophy of the Act. 
The problem of the division between real and personal property is not a new one. There 
is a substantial body of case law dating back centuries providing principles upon which 
interests have been categorised. The difficulty with such doctrines is that they are 
primarily historically based and are not always in accordance with modern business practice 
and the common understanding of such transactions. The PPSA is intended to sweep away 
the cobwebs of an archaic system using on fine technical distinctions based on legal 
concepts, and deal with transaction according to their substance and effect. Any court 
addressing issues of the scope of the PPSA should approach the question with an eye to 
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ensuring a rational and practical application of the Act rather than perpetuating distinctions 
which are a result of the peculiar historical development of the law of property. 
A Assignments of Payments Secured by an Interest in Land 
One kind of transaction which has come before the Canadian courts in respect of the scope 
of the PPSA on several occasions is where a one party has assigned its right to payment 
under a mortgage of land to another party. Consider the following situation: 
Ltd is in the business of advancing money on the security of real property mortgages. It advances
 
money on the security of such mortgages to mortgagors X Y and Z. Ltd finances its transactions
 
by an assignment of the loan agreements (but not the mortgages) to Bank in return for funding as
 
required. Bank, after searching the PPSA register and ascertaining that no other secured parties exis
t 
in respect of the debt, registers its interest under the PPSA. Ltd falls upon hard times and assigns
 
the mortgages (including the right to receive payments) to Financier who has searched the land
 
transfer registry and ascertained that they are in fact held in the name of Ltd. The assignment is
 
registered under the Land Transfer Act. 
In such a case both secured parties can arguably say that they ought to prevail in the event 
of the insolvency of Ltd. 
In the first place Bank can argue that the interest it took was the assignment of a purely 
personal debt. This point is illustrated by noting that in the event of default by Ltd, Bank 
would not be able to effect its security by obtaining a transfer of the mortgages and 
foreclosing under those mortgages in the event that the debtors did not pay. Rather it 
would be limited to requiring the mo11gagors to pay the instalments directly to them and 
in the event of default taking personal actions against the mortgagors. On the other hand 
Financier will argue that it searched the land transfer registry and ascertained that the 
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mortgages were held in the name of Ltd and they received an assignment of the r
ights 
under the mortgages which were perfected by registration under the Land Transfer A
ct. 
As can be seen, whether or not such transactions are brought within the scope of the P
PSA 
will have a significant effect on the rights of the parties. In the first place the sec
ured 
creditor who receives an assignment of both the mortgage and the right to payment w
ould 
otherwise have to register in two registries for full protection. Similarly third p
arties 
seeking an interest in such collateral would have to search multiple registries to ensur
e that 
both the mortgage and the account receivable was unencumbered. 
One (traditional) manner in which the problem can be resolved is by recourse to
 the 
underlying conceptual basis upon which a real property mortgage and the assoc
iated 
obligation to pay has been construed to exist. On such an analysis the transaction inv
olves 
two elements;93 firstly the obligation to repay the loan which is the primary element
 and, 
secondly the mortgagees interest in the land which secures the obligation to repay the 
loan. 
A mortgage and the associated obligation to pay has long been recognised as of a
 dual 
nature; the debt itself being created by the personal covenant of the mortgagor/debto
r and 
the mortgage itself being a grant of an interest in land creating rights which coul
d be 
exercised in the event of a default of the personal covenant. 
The problem has been dealt with before the Canadian courts in a conflicting manner
. Re 
93"An Article Nine Scope Problem- Mortgages, Leases and Rents as Collateral" (1976) 
47 U Col LR 449, 455. 
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Urman94 concerned a case similar to the example above. A mortgage broker (Urman)
 was 
in the business of arranging loans secured by mortgages over real property and then se
lling 
them, either outright or to syndicated trusts. Urman's business was financed by a revol
ving 
line of credit which was subject to a PPSA registered security over all of his book d
ebts 
generally. When in financial difficulty Urman assigned two mortgages to a third part
y by 
way of security for a further loan. The assignment was registered at the land registry o
ffice 
and the mortgagors were notified. The Court of Appeal (reversing the lower court) 
held 
that the obligation to pay and the rights over the land were inseparable. Therefore
 the 
bank's interest was defeated in favour of the assignees of the mortgages who had regist
ered 
their interest under the land transfer legislation. 
Royal Bank v Kleemola
95 adopted the reasoning of the lower court in Re Urman which 
had been rejected on appeal.
96 In Kleemola one James was the mortgagee of some land 
and was entitled to receive payments under the arrangements. In order to obtain and se
cure 
a loan the right to those payments was transferred to the Royal Bank who registered 
their 
interest in the PPSA registry. Kleemola then loaned money to James and sought to se
cure 
his interest by an absolute assignment of the mortgage which was registered in the 
land 
transfer office. The Court held that the interest of tl1e bank prevailed on the insolvenc
y of 
the mortgagee. The basis for this decision was that James had effectively disposed o
f the 
94(1983) 3 PPSAC 191 (Ont CA). Since this decision the matter has been clarified by 
an amendment which inserts s 3(1)(e) which operates to exclude "The creation
 or 
assignment of an interest in real property including a mortgage charge or lease of
 real 
property". 
95(1991) 2 PPSAC 2d 5 (Man QB). 
96For a discussion of the first instance judgement in Re Urman see J Ziegel "The Scope 
of the Ontario Personal Property Securities Act- Recent Developments" (1981) 6 Cana
dian 
Business Law Journal 107. 
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right to receive payments under the mortgage to the bank and the bank'
s right, being 
personal, was perfected by registration. Kleemola therefore could only receiv
e the residual 
interest which was the worthless mortgage with no attached obligation 
to pay. The 
approach of treating assignments of real property mortgages as having a dual
 character has 
come in for criticism. 
97 One aspect of that criticism is the observation that the result of 
treating mortgages as being of a dual nature is to require registration of th
eir transfer in 
two registries: a complication to the law that such reform is seeking to avo
id. 
Interestingly in Kleemola Hirschfield J noted that he had considered the earli
er case before 
the same court of Ranjoy Sales and Leasing Ltd v Down.
98 In Ranjoy a mortgage broker 
had become bankrupt. The unsecured creditors in the liquidation maintaine
d that certain 
transfers of the mortgages and trust instruments conferring legal and equi
table interests 
respectively were void on the insolvency under the Manitoba PPSA. The
 court in that 
case came to the conclusion that the interests transferred in the mortgages 
(including the 
right to receive payment) were real property and not subject to the provisio
ns of the Act. 
In Ranjoy Sales and Leasing Wright J referred to the (later overturned) 
first instance 
decision in Re Urman
99 and noting the similarities between the facts and that the 
provisions of the Ontario and Manitoba statutes were materially identical s
aid: 
However after a careful review of that case I am unable to conclude that
 it can be relied on as an 
accurate interpretation of the Manitoba Personal Property Security Act C
ertainly the decision that 
real property security is subject to either the Manitoba or Ontario Act 
seems on the face to be 
totally inconsistent with the with the nature and intention of the legisl
ation. A reading of the 
97See Ziegel above n 96. 
98(1982) 2 PPSAC 107 (Man QB). 
99(1981) 1 PPSAC 340 (Ont HC). 
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Manitoba statute in full reveals numerous sections where this is 
evident, and it appears to me that 
the Manitoba Act at least can be reasonably interpreted as not intendin
g to cover real property 
interest. 
In saying this Wright J acknowledged and approved the comments 
of Ziegel100 which 
suggested that interests in mortgages should be treated as indivisibl
e from the land. 
The approach in Ranjoy Sales and Leasing seems to be the m
ore widely accepted 
approach. 10
1 The adoption of the dual analysis of a mortgage as found in Klee
mola is 
less widely accepted. A technical approach as found in Kleemola wo
uld not be appropriate 
under the proposed Act. The Act is founded in principles which 
seek to avoid overly 
technical distinctions in an effort to avoid a multiplicity of register
s and to simplify the 
registration procedure. The division of real mortgages into real p
roperty interests and 
personal covenants ignores the fact that a perfectly workable system
 for the recording of 
the holding and transfer of interests in mortgages exists in the form 
of the Land Transfer 
Registry. If the Act were passed into law in its present form clause
 4(5)(b)(ix) could act 
as a vehicle for the courts in avoiding the trap into which Hirschfie
ld J in Re Kleemola 
fell. 102 Provided that that section was interpreted purposively 
the right to receive 
payments under a mortgage could be described as a right to payment
 arising in connection 
with an interest in land. The simple way around the problem wo
uld be to amend the 
provision to also exclude rights to payment arising from a security 
interest in land. 
100J Ziegel, above n 96. 
101Assiboine Credit Union Ltd v CIBC (1984) 3 PPSAC 177 (Man CA
). 
102The American courts are further hampered by Article 9-102 which 
provides: 
The application of this Article to a security interest in a secured ob
ligation is not effected by the fact 
that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to w
hich this Article does not apply. 
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B Assignment of in personam Rights Concerning Land 
Another area where the division between real and personal property 
is unclear is in respect 
of contractual or personal rights concerning land. One such right is
 a contractual right to 
occupy and control land; that is to say a lease. Leases occupy a str
ange place in property 
law and have been labelled 
II chattels real 
II thus denoting the fact that they are personal 
property but conferring rights in respect of land. It is established 
law that the right of a 
lessee to occupy land does not amount to an interest in that land and
 under the doctrine of 
tenure no estate is held. However the fact is that the right to occu
py can be maintained 
against the world and is tantamount to an interest in the land. Further
more, provision exists 
for the registration of such interests under the Land Transfer Act. 
Whether interests in 
leases will fall within the scope of the PPSA is unclear. Rights i
n respect of land that 
amount to property other than leases may exist. One such right m
ay be the right to use 
land in a particular manner issued by an administrative body such as 
a liquor licence which 
attaches to the premises rather than the proprietor. A right to receiv
e money in respect of 
a contract for the sale of land is also personal property. It is pos
sible for any of these 
rights may be transferred either unconditionally or by way of securit
y. It will therefore be 
necessary to determine whether such arrangements would fall within 
the scope of the PPSA 
or not. 
The draft Act expressly excludes interests in land and rights to paym
ents under an interest 
in land including rent. 
103 However this does not necessarily exclude any of the 
transactions described above. Interestingly both Ontario and B
ritish Columbia have 
included in their Personal Property Security Acts provisions atte
mpting to clarify the 
103Clause 4(5)(b)(iii) and (ix). 
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position of such transactions under the Act The Ontario A
ct provides that it does not 
apply to "the creation or assignment of an interest in real pro
perty including a mortgage, 
charge or lease of real property" .
104 The British Columbia Legislation excludes from its 
scope: "the creation or transfer of an interest in land, other th
an an interest arising out of 
a licence, including a lease". The draft Act has no such pro
visions and, looking at the 
Canadian experience, will require one. To include such inter
ests within the scope of the 
Act would mean registering the assignment of leases by w
ay of security in both the 
personal property security and land transfer registry. Correspo
ndingly third parties would 
have to search both registries to determine with certainty wh
at interests existed in such 
leases. 
An example of a lessee using its interest as security can be 
found in Re CTL Uniforms 
Ltd105 where CTL had given a floating charge over its entire 
undertaking to its financier. 
On the insolvency of CTL the liquidator had sold the company
's assets including its rights 
of occupancy as lessee to three retail sites. The financier was a
rguing that, unlike the other 
assets of the company, the leases were real property and there
fore the security interest in 
them was not void on insolvency under the PPSA. This argume
nt was rejected by the court 
who found the leases to be personal property and the charg
e, not being perfected by 
registration, was void against the liquidator. This case wa
s heavily criticised
106 and 
resulted in an amendment to the legislation. 
107 Similar problems in respect of leasehold 
interests have been experienced in the United States under
 Article 9. In E Landau 
104Section 3(1)(e) 
105(1981)1 PPSAC 308 (Ont SC). 
106J Ziegel, above n 96. 
107 Above n 94. 
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Industries Inc v 385 McLean Corp
108 a lessee assigned its interest in the lease as security 
for a $30 OOO advance. The interest in the lease was 
registered in accordance with real 
property law. When the creditor sought to enforce its s
ecurity it was held unable to do so 
due to a breach of the remedies provisions of Article 9
. It was held that the arrangement 
was subject to Article 9 as it amounted to a mortgage o
f a leasehold and this was therefore 
a mortgage of personal property under that Article. 
109 
If the draft Act is passed in its present form a conclusio
n such as that in re CTL Uniforms 
Ltd would be almost inevitable before the New Zeal
and courts on similar facts. The 
classification of leasehold interests as personal prop
erty is a well established rule of 
property law and would be applied accordingly. This 
would be the case notwithstanding 
the fact that such a conclusion would clearly be again
st the intent of the drafters. The 
inappropriateness of such a conclusion is particularly
 apparent in light of the fact that 
securities over rental payments under a lease are exclu
ded110 and the Land Transfer Act 
1955 provides a comprehensive scheme for the registrat
ion of interests in leaseholds. The 
draft Act needs to be amended to clarify this matter and
 the only sensible manner to clarify 
it is to exclude security transactions over leases from the sco
pe of the Act altogether as in 
British Columbia and Ontario.
111 
108(1969) 296 NYS 2d 707 (Sup Ct). 
109Interestingly this decision was made notwithstanding 
the provisions of Article 9-
104(j) which provides that the Article does not apply: 
except to the extent that provision is made for fixtures in 
section 9-313, to the creation or transfer 
of an interest in or lien on real estate including a lease or
 rents thereunder ... 
The court seemed to take the approach that that section 
applied only to the lessors transfer 
of an interest in the lease. 
11°Clause (4)(5)(b)(ix). 
111Above n 94. 
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Leasehold interests are not the only in personam rig
hts which are connected with land. 
Another such right which has caused difficulties is t
he vendors right to receive payments 
under a contract for the sale of land. Such a right
 to receive payment (rather than the 
ownership of the land itself) might be used as securit
y for an advance. An example of this 
can be found in Re Starblanket. 
112 In that case the debtors were attempting to sell their
 
home. They obtained an advance of $25 OOO from 
the Continental Bank of Canada. As 
security for the advance they assigned the right to th
e proceeds of the sale of the property 
to the bank. In due course the house was sold howev
er before the bank was repaid the 
debtors became bankrupt. Under the Ontario Act un
perfected security interest in personal 
property are ineffective against a liquidator. In order to 
avoid this the bank argued that the 
security was an interest in land and therefore enforc
eable. It was held by the Court that 
the assignment of the debt of a future purchaser of r
eal estate did not create an interest in 
land but was personal property and the security was
 unenforceable. 
In contrast to the vendor's right to receive payment
 under a contract of sale is the 
purchaser's right to performance of a contract for the
 sale and purchase of real estate. In 
Dominion Bank NA v Wilsonm the debtor had an opt
ion to purchase real property. The 
creditor had a floating charge which extended to all p
ersonal property including contractual 
rights (which would have included the option). The
 debtor exercised the option but the 
vendor was unable to settle. When the creditor soug
ht to enforce its security and assume 
the contract of purchase it was held by the court that
 the right to enforce the contract was 
not personal property and therefore outside of the 
scope of Article 9. Rather once an 
112(1988) 8 PPSAC 195 (Ont SC). 
m(1989) 867 F2d 203. 
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agreement to purchase existed the intending purch
aser obtained equitable title to the land 
which was a real property interest. 
The reasons for finding the rights in re Starblanke
t and Dominion Bank to be real and 
personal interests respectively are not contentious n
or do they contravene the spirit of intent 
of the Act The cases are however an indicatio
n that where financiers choose to take 
security in an unusual manner careful attention i
s needed to ensure that the security is 
perfected appropriately. Similarly where security 
is taken over an entire undertaking as 
in the case of many floating charges it should be 
recognised that the assets of the debtor 
may in the course of dealing change from real to 
personal property or vice versa. 
The philosophy of the PPSA is firmly based in the
 realist tradition and it has little time for 
the fine distinctions which the common law plac
es on different kinds of property. The 
draft Act fails insofar as it does not prevent those 
distinctions from finding their way into 
the new system of registration. The Act needs 
to be amended along the lines of the 
Ontario Act
114 to ensure that the scope of the Act is determined 
according to the nature 
and subject matter of the transaction rather than th
e niceties of the law and the history of 
the doctrine of tenure. As was said in National Tru
st Co v Bouckhuyt
115 when Henry J 
was rejecting an argument based on common law
 doctrines in respect of the distinction 
between real and personal property: 
Having regard to the general purpose of the PPSA, w
hich is to consolidate into one statute, and so 
harmonise the law of personal property as security fo
r debts, it is not open to parties to frustrate the 
114Above n 94. 
115(1987) 7 PPSAC 113 (Ont SC), later overturned o
n appeal: (1987) 7 PPSAC 273. 
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operation of the Act by a constructive conversion 
of what is in fact a chattel or intangible intended 
as security into a notional form of real property. 
Similarly the Act should ensure that it reflects
 business reality. The fact is that a system 
exists for the registration of interests in mor
tgages and leases in the form of the Land 
Transfer Registry. To enable such transaction
s to also fall within the scope of the PPSA 
would be to perpetuate complexities and dupl
icities in the law which the PPSA seeks to 
avoid. 
VI RIGHTS IN THINGS NOT AMOUNTING
 TO PROPERTY 
The PPSA recognises that many classes of th
ings can be described as personal property. 
Whilst in the middle ages anything other tha
n tangible property was considered to be 
nothing more than a right in personam, the law 
has developed with business practice to 
recognise many other less tangible things as ca
pable of being owned. However there will 
be things which are not property for one reason
 or another. Whether something is property 
at all can be thought of as largely a matter 
of prescriptive law. It was not until the 
nineteenth century that it was accepted by the 
common law that account receivables were 
personal property which were capable of being
 transferred. A more recent phenomena is 
the proliferation of permissions to engage in other
wise prohibited conduct issued by 
administrative governmental bodies. These of
ten take the form of licenses (as in the case 
of liquor licences or casino licences) or quotas
 (such as fishing quotas). The terms upon 
which such rights are granted vary according 
to the governing rules. Such licences may 
be transferred with varying degrees of freedom
. In cases where they may be transferred, 
and the governing bodies issue them in a limi
ted amount, it is not unusual for premiums 
well in excess of the issue price to be paid. 
This has caused considerable difficulty in 
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Canadian jurisdictions. The courts have been divided i
n their approach to such problems, 
some treating such rights as property capable of being u
sed as collateral whilst others have 
considered them to be merely personal rights. 
It is clear from the case law that such quotas and licen
ces are used as collateral relatively 
frequently, as is to be expected where such an asset will fo
rm a large part of the total 
worth of a business. To exclude them from the PPSA 
would be to undermine their value 
as property which can be used as collateral and dep
rive their owners of an otherwise 
legitimate method of raising capital. Financiers may b
e unwilling to accept such a thing 
as collateral unless they can be reasonably certain that 
it was free of existing interests. In 
the absence of a system of registration this would not be
 possible. Conversely to recognise 
such things as capable of serving as collateral would re
inforce their status as property and 
recognise a fact which is already a commercial realit
y. Inclusion within the draft Act 
would avoid the existence of a discrete area of proper
ty security law being subject to a 
separate set of rules. 
An obvious example. of such a right is a quota for the
 production or harvest of primary 
produce. In Canada there exist primary produce market
ing boards, similar to those in New 
Zealand, who are authorised by statute to regulate the pr
oduction of certain products by the 
issuing of quotas. The leading Case on the matter is 
National Trust Co v Bouckhuyr
16
• 
In that case a farmer had sold a farm and taken a mortg
age back over all the real property 
which was intended to include a quota for the productio
n of tobacco. Some time later the 
116(1987) 7 PPSAC 273 (Ont CA) reversing the earlier 
decision found at (1987) 7 
PPSAC 113 (Ont HC). 
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buyer of the farm obtained finance from the N
ational Trust Co and granted security over 
certain personal property including the quota. 
The security arrangements were registered 
in the Land Transfer and Personal Property 
registries by the different secured parties 
respectively. It arose to be determined which 
secured party had priority in respect of the 
quota. The Court of Appeal, reversing the tria
l judge's finding, concluded that the quota 
was neither personal nor real property at all th
erefore the PPSA security was ineffective. 
In so finding the court recognised the factual ob
servation in the court below that the quota 
could be leased and transferred however the co
urt stated that "although the [quota] might 
be sold in a limited market, the mere fact tha
t it could be exchanged, sold, pledged or 
leased does not in itself make it property" .
117 One of the grounds for the decision was 
the fact that the creation and transfer of the r
ights was subject to the discretion of the 
regulating body. The case has been followe
d and applied to similar arrangements. us 
Such an approach is at odds with the philosophy
 of the Act which is intended to be flexible 
and able to adopt to include novel transactions.
 The finding of the Court of Appeal rested 
on an outmoded (and arguably incorrect) class
ification of what will amount to property. 
The decision has been strongly criticised. In a
n annotation in the reportsu
9 it was noted 
that this was a departure from the American 
approach which treated such transferrable 
rights as subject to Article 9 and further tha
t it failed to take account of commercial 
realities. 
The Bouckhuyt case was considered and not fo
llowed in Saskatoon Auction Mart Ltd v 
117 Above n 116, 285. 
u8Re Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Ha
llahan (1990) 69 DLR 4th 449 (Ont 
HC) where a milk production quota was held n
ot to be personal property. 
u9R H McLaren (1987) 7 PPSAC 285. 
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Finesse Holsteins.
120 The case concerned a security granted over "all goods chattels and 
personal property of every nature and kind" which had been registe
red under the PPSA. 
The sole question for determination was whether a milk productio
n quota (which was 
materially identical to the tobacco production quota in Bouckhuyt) c
ame within the scope 
of the charge. Matheson J considered the Ontario Court of Appeal to h
ave been wrong in 
Bouckhuyt and found that such quotas are personal property capable
 of being subject to a 
security agreement. 
In the cases discussed above the quotas referred to were transferrable pr
oviding that purely 
formal steps were complied with. This element of transferability 
has been considered 
essential to classifying such rights as property. Thus where a 
security interest was 
purportedly created over a licence to operate a nursing home it was
 held that the licence 
was not property because no provision existed for the transfer of t
he licence. 121 In Re 
Foster122 several parties alleged security interests in a taxi opera
tor's licence on the 
bankruptcy of the holder. The governing statute created a right to 
renew and a right to 
transfer limited by the time the transferor has held the licence, fees, 
and other formalities. 
The Court held that notwithstanding that at the time the arrangements
 were entered into the 
licence could not have been transferred, the fact that it could be tran
sferred at a later date 
meant that it was property and the security interests came within the
 scope of the PPSA. 
One writer, in considering liquor licences under Article 9, noted the m
anner in which such 
120(1992) 4 PPSAC 2d 67 (Sask QB) 
121209991 Ontario Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Ltd (1
988) 8 PPSAC 
135 (Ont HC). 
122(1992) 89 DLR 4th 555 (Ont Ct GD). 
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rights acquire the characteristics of property: 
123 
Whatever the qualities conferred upon the licence, where the nu
mbers in wbicb it is issued are 
limited a licence can acquire great value provided that it bas some e
lement of transferability. Value, 
together with transferability, makes the liquor licence a candidate f
or bypothecation in the form of 
an Article 9 security interesL This invests the licence with all it n
eeds to be treated as property in 
the marketplace, whatever the characterisation it may have receiv
ed at the bands of a licensing 
statute. The liquor licence under these circumstances might thus be
 said to have acquired a market 
definition of property. 
This suggests that it is the manner in which such rights are trea
ted and dealt with in the 
marketplace which ought to define whether or not they are capabl
e of being property under 
the PPSA. Clearly if such rights are capable of being bought 
and sold then it will be 
equally possible to enter into arrangements using them as secu
rity for obligations. To 
ignore such arrangements would be to exclude a small but importa
nt class of property from 
the scope of the Act. 
To ensure that such assets are included in the scope of the Act 
is not easily effected by 
amending the legislation. Such transferrable rights can exist in m
any forms. To attempt 
to expressly include such arrangements would be likely to 
impose on the Act an 
inflexibility which would render it incapable of adapting to nove
l situations which might 
arise. This may be a situation where the New Zealand judiciary
 will need to learn from 
their North American counterparts. It is impossible to reform and 
codify an area of the law 
as technical and diverse as that of property security without an app
ropriate judicial attitude 
to the statute attempting to effect that purpose. Once the reform
 legislation is in place it 
123S Knippenberg "Tacit Exclusion: Defining code Terms Using Extr
aneous Referents" 
(1988) 39 Syracuse LR 1261, 1271. 
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must be left to the judges in each particular case to give effect to it in the manner in which 
it is intended. One area where this will be particularly apparent is that of transferrable 
rights conferred by government organisations like quotas and licences. It is hoped that the 
courts will approach such transaction by looking at the market realities and the intent and 
effect of the transaction between the parties rather than by traditional methods of 
categorising the rights into existing classes of property. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to highlight certain transactions which fall in one way or another 
on the fringes of the law of personal property securities. In some instances the inclusion 
or exclusion of such transaction from the scope of any proposed reform may be one of pure 
policy. This will be particularly the case in respect of transactions between large 
institutions where notice of the party's interests need not be made public and third parties 
are not generally put at risk by such arrangements. However in other instances it is 
necessary to include certain transactions within the scope of the legislation to avoid 
creating imbalances and anomalies in the law. This is particularly the case in respect of 
the practice of banks to take security over deposits which may be categorised a right of set 
off rather than a security arrangement. Such transactions need to be included within the 
scope of the PPSA in order to ensure that the law accords with the practice and perception 
of business in the community. 
Other arrangements are simply a matter of the clarification of the borders of the PPSA. 
The position in respect of the crossover between real and personal property falls into this 
category. As was demonstrated, in some jurisdictions this grey area has led to a need to 
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register securities in multiple registries. Some Personal Property Security Acts have been 
amended to clarify this point. It would seem sensible for interests in leases, and interests 
in funds secured by a interests in land to be subject to the Land Transfer Act 1955 rather 
than the PPSA. In any event clarification is required. 
In some instances to attempt to clarify the situation by amending the draft Act would serve 
no purpose other than to complicate and rigidify the Act. For this reform to be effective 
a purposive approach will need to be taken by the courts. One situation where this has 
been shown to be particularly apparent in other jurisdictions in respect to quotas and 
licences. In such cases the courts, to give effect to the legislation, need to view the 
commercial realities of the situation rather than relying on established and sometimes 
archaic principles of law. The key to effective reform will be in providing a 
comprehensive and coherent structure for the registration of security interests in personal 
property which is capable of adapting to the changing practices of the business community. 
This can be only in part effected by statute. A large part of the task will lie in the hands 
of the judiciary who, to give such an Act its intended effect, will need to adopt a new, 
realist, approach to security transactions which is at odds with the functional tradition 
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